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ABSTRACT 
Since Bitcoin’s release in late 2008, the cryptocurrency has grown and proven 
itself as a disruptive technology, resistant to sovereign law and international financial 
regulations, and an alternative to the sovereign state’s concept of fiat money. The Wild 
West nature of cryptocurrency has enabled a number of individuals, criminal 
organizations, terrorist groups, and sovereign states to use Bitcoin, among other 
cryptocurrencies, to avoid detection, interference, or punishment from regulatory 
agencies to commit actions such as money laundering, trafficking narcotics, purchasing 
weapons, and bypassing international sanctions. This thesis addresses the disruptive 
nature of cryptocurrency by asking what legislative options are available to sovereign 
states to maximize the effectiveness of sovereign laws while limiting undesired 
cryptocurrency use. To tackle this question, this thesis breaks down the legislative actions 
countries may take into three categories—prohibition, regulation, and adoption—to 
investigate the benefits, limitations, and effects of each policy. By examining the 
legislative actions of countries like China, the United States, and Russia, this thesis finds 
that sovereign states have had limited success in preventing illicit cryptocurrency use; 
however, without implementing a refined, multifaceted global regulatory standard on 
cryptocurrency transactions in the near future, cryptocurrency will remain an unchecked 
means to transact on an international scale. 
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A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION 
On October 31, 2008, the pseudonymous Satoshi Nakamoto released his proposal 
for an electronic cash system known as Bitcoin.1 In the nine years that have passed since 
Bitcoin’s proposal, Bitcoin2 and other cryptocurrencies have gained popularity in the 
international community as a medium of transaction transcending current financial 
institutions and cross-border regulations. Additionally, state governments, banks, and 
investors have shown an increasing interest in using cryptocurrencies to enhance their own 
financial capabilities. Furthermore, because the blockchain technology used in 
cryptocurrency allows its users to “transact directly without the need for a trusted third 
party,” the payee and recipient in transactions remain anonymous outside of their digital 
wallet signature.3  
Despite the advantages that Bitcoin and other cryptocurrencies offer in the 
marketplace, cryptocurrencies also generate new sets of obstacles for international 
financial institutions and state governments regulating or monitoring transactions. The 
pseudonymity4 provided to the users by cryptocurrencies, coupled with the ease of 
transaction, has proved to be a reliable tool for non-state and criminal networks pursuing 
methods to bypass taxes, governmental regulations, and international sanctions. 
The questions in this thesis are built upon the premise that cryptocurrencies offer 
new and unprecedented challenges to sovereign states’ ability to regulate and enforce laws 
governing its monetary policy, security, and trade; therefore, the state—and by extension 
the international community—will endeavor to develop policies to increase sovereign 
                                                 
1 Satoshi Nakamoto, “Bitcoin: A Peer-to-Peer Electronic Cash System” (white paper, Bitcoin, 2008), 
1, https://bitcoin.org/bitcoin.pdf.  
2 In the literature reviewed, there is no standard among authors on whether Bitcoin is capitalized or 
not. For this thesis, the term Bitcoin is capitalized when discussing the cryptocurrency as a technology, 
system, or network, while units of the cryptocurrency as measurements of wealth or transaction costs use a 
lower case "b". This distinction is discussed in greater detail in Chapter II.  
3 Nakamoto, 1–2.  
4 The concept of pseudonymity (or pseudo-anonymity) is discussed in greater detail in Chapter II.  
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states’ control on the use of cryptocurrency. The questions this thesis seeks to answer are: 
What options are available to the sovereign state to limit cryptocurrency’s capacity to 
challenge domestic and international laws? What allows cryptocurrency to sidestep the 
established financial order and enforcement institutions? What are the challenges sovereign 
states face when introducing cryptocurrency legislation? Finally, as cryptocurrency 
technology becomes more popular and countries begin developing their own blockchain-
based tools, what factors will inhibit or promote a sovereign state from developing their 
own sovereign cryptocurrency?   
B. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
Cryptocurrencies like Bitcoin challenge the post-Bretton Woods system of 
financial control on worldwide transactions. The bitcoin currency is decentralized and 
therefore is neither issued by any government nor stored in any one location. Decentralized 
currencies like Bitcoin utilize a distributed public ledger, barring the need for a trusted third 
party.5 With cryptocurrencies, mints do not “print” cryptocurrency, banks are not required 
to store cryptocurrency, and escrow agents are unnecessary to verify transactions. To many 
consumers, decentralized cryptocurrency appears to be a superior method of transaction in 
terms of efficiency and transaction cost; however, to a state, the removal of the trusted and 
regulated third party carries significant drawbacks concerning government’s control of 
commerce. 
Since the emergence of Bitcoin, cryptocurrencies have weakened sovereign 
governments’ capacity to protect their citizens from harm because they sidestep the 
regulations that monitor monetary transactions. During normal fiat6 transactions, trusted 
third parties like banks, credit card companies, or escrow agents restrict and report 
transactions with ties to criminal or terrorist entities. As a result, individuals and 
organizations transacting with fiat are required to register with trusted third parties, 
                                                 
5 Decentralized or distributed public ledgers are explained in Chapter II detailing how 
cryptocurrencies function.  
6 According to Investopedia, the definition of “Fiat money is currency that a government has declared 
to be legal tender, but it is not backed by a physical commodity” (e.g., the U.S. dollar). Brent Radcliffe, 
“Fiat Money,” Investopedia, November 20, 2003, https://www.investopedia.com/terms/f/fiatmoney.asp.  
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providing personal information to assist authorities in tracking and prosecuting individuals 
who commit illegal activities. Cryptocurrencies like Bitcoin bypass the difficulties in 
transactions that state governments have put in place to prevent illegal actions. 
Herein lies the problem. Cryptocurrencies do not operate within the existing 
financial system, and the existing banking agreements and laws are unprepared to challenge 
cryptocurrency use. To counter illicit use, sovereign states must create new laws across the 
existing state and international financial institutions to limit cryptocurrency transactions. 
However, in the development of new legislation, lawmakers will be forced to wrestle 
between the limitations of sovereign laws on cryptocurrency and the needs of domestic and 
homeland security. Likewise, the government’s pursuit of new laws will likely be 
restrained by the protection of liberties guaranteed to the citizens the anonymity inherent 
cryptocurrency’s blockchain. Therefore, the significance of this thesis’s research questions 
is to highlight the evolving challenges that sovereign states will encounter as 
cryptocurrencies become more mainstream. This thesis also analyzes the potential avenues 
of interaction and partnership between the existing financial intuitions and regulatory 
bodies as they seek to limit, regulate, and standardize transactions utilizing 
cryptocurrencies.  
C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The bulk of the literature available on cryptocurrency adoption is relatively new, 
with the first scholarly articles débuting in the years following Bitcoin traction as a traded 
commodity and method of transaction in 2011.7 Most of the literature available also refers 
solely to Bitcoin, or uses the terms cryptocurrency and Bitcoin interchangeably. This is 
because Bitcoin is the first virtual currency to rely on cryptography as a means of security 
while implementing a public distributed ledger to track transactions (Chapter II of this 
thesis explains both ideas).8 As of early 2018, there are nearly 1500 public 
                                                 
7 Paul Vigna and Michael Casey, The Age of Cryptocurrency: How Bitcoin and Digital Money Are 
Challenging The Global Economic Order (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2015), 83–84.  
8 Arvind Narayanan et al., Bitcoin and Cryptocurrency Technologies: A Comprehensive Introduction 
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2016), 1, 242.  
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cryptocurrencies, totaling a market cap of more than half a trillion dollars.9 As noted in a 
2017 study by the Cambridge Centre for Alternate Finance, there are “over 300 academic 
articles on the various aspects of bitcoin and other cryptocurrencies over the past several 
years.”10 This thesis’s literature review surveys various authors’ studies and opinions 
relating to the illicit history of cryptocurrency and the role states and international 
institutions should take regarding cryptocurrency transactions.  
The first section briefly covers the literature available on the historical use of 
Bitcoin as a means to conduct illegal transactions and bypass financial regulations. This 
section outlines some of the encounters law enforcement has had with cryptocurrency, and 
the methods cryptocurrency users have employed to bypass existing laws. The second 
section builds on the history of illegal activity using cryptocurrency and presents the 
literature detailing how the United States can potentially regulate cryptocurrencies within 
its existing legal frameworks. The third and final section expands upon the second by 
examining literature attempting to tackle cryptocurrency implementation on a global scale 
through the use of international financial institutions and international agreements. 
1. Illicit Uses of Bitcoin and Other Cryptocurrencies 
A survey of recent research establishes that the lack of regulation in cryptocurrency 
has become a homeland security concern in addition to being a criminal one. In academia, 
there is little debate among scholars that individuals use cryptocurrencies to circumvent 
laws and commit illegal activities. Various publications from U.S. government reports and 
their various funded research groups to scholars and writers following the emerging 
cryptocurrency trends around the globe all acknowledge this. Furthermore, because 
cryptocurrency offers a combination of trust in value, anonymity, lack of regulation, and 
                                                 
9 “Cryptocurrency Market Capitalizations,” CoinMarketCap, accessed March 5, 2018, 
https://coinmarketcap.com/.  
10 Garrick Hileman and Michel Rauchs, Global Cryptocurrency Benchmarking Study (Cambridge: 
University of Cambridge Centre for Alternate Finance, 2017), https://www.jbs.cam.ac.uk/fileadmin/
user_upload/research/centres/alternative-finance/downloads/2017-global-cryptocurrency-benchmarking-
study.pdf, 5.  
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transferability across borders, the authors who study cryptocurrency’s impact to the state 
vary in their area of expertise.   
The U.S. government has keenly noticed the capabilities virtual currencies provide 
to the illicit marketplace, but most of the government backed public research has just 
emerged in the past five years. The research conducted by the U.S. government agencies 
and various U.S. funded research groups tends to concentrate on the future potential threats 
that cryptocurrency may pose to the state’s ability to impose financial restrictions, tax, and 
protect its citizens; however, this research has yet to reach a consensus of long-term 
solutions. As a 2015 Congressional Research Service report states, “in Congress, interest 
in virtual currencies is at the exploratory stage.”11 The 2015 National Terrorist Financing 
Risk Assessment report by the U.S. Treasury lists “new payment systems … like Virtual 
Currencies (VC) such as Bitcoin and other emerging payment technologies” as potential 
future terrorist financing threats.12 Additionally, the 2017 National Drug Threat 
Assessment produced by the DEA (Drug Enforcement Administration) writes that “TCO 
[transnational criminal organizations] are … increasingly using virtual currencies due to 
their anonymizing nature and ease of use.”13 Likewise, the RAND corporation’s National 
Security Implications of Virtual Currency highlights various methods how 
cryptocurrencies could “enhance non-state actor’s political and/or economic power ... by 
means of illicit transfer, fundraising, or money laundering.”14  
Cryptocurrencies’ connection to the illicit marketplace first received attention after 
the development of the Silk Road in 2013, a website only accessible through the Dark Web, 
                                                 
11 Edward Murphy, Maureen Murphy, and Michael Seitzinger, Bitcoin: Questions, Answers, and 
Analysis of Legal Issues, CRS Report No. R43339 (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 
2015), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R43339.pdf, 10.  




13 Drug Enforcement Administration, 2017 National Drug Threat Assessment, DEA-DCT-DIR-040-
17 (Washington, DC: Drug Enforcement Administration, 2017), https://www.dea.gov/docs/DIR-040-
17_2017-NDTA.pdf, 130.  
14 Joshua Baron et al., National Security Implications of Virtual Currency: Examining the Potential 
for Non-State Actors Development (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2015), ix–x, 
https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR1231.html.   
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which is the part of the web users need special software to access and thus remain 
anonymous.15 Nicolas Christin writes that during the Silk Road’s period of operation 
between 2011 and 2013, it acted as an “infrastructure for sellers and buyers to conduct 
transactions ... similar to Amazon Marketplace, Craigslist, or eBay,” but for both illegal 
and legal goods.16 Christin estimates the Silk Road earned a monthly income of 1.2 million 
U.S. dollars (USD), stating that the dark website offered a variety of goods, mostly 
providing legal and illegal drugs, which the site categorized into 220 distinct groups for 
the ease of the dark website’s users.17  
Steven Brown directs his research toward how illegal use of Bitcoin affects the 
capability of state’s law enforcement, arguing that Bitcoin “is the currency of choice for 
cybercriminals and Darknet entrepreneurs.”18 He writes that the lack of regulation in 
cryptocurrency transactions has created “attractive opportunities for criminal exploitation,” 
and he lists a varying field of illegal activities available to Darknet users where Bitcoin is 
the primary method of payment.19 He also lists the examples of illegal services transacting 
in bitcoins, including the laundering of fiat currencies, counterfeiting U.S. dollars, 
purchasing illegal drugs, and hiring assassination services.20  
While the majority of literature expects to see increased incidents of terrorists using 
cryptocurrency, the actual capability of individuals and non-state actors to use virtual 
currencies to support terrorism is contested among academics. Scholars like William 
Mendel and Peter McCabe believe cryptocurrency is a current homeland security issue. 
They argue that Bitcoin offers new challenges to the U.S. mission to counter support and 
financing of the Islamic State (IS) that extends worldwide, citing a 2015 incident when the 
                                                 
15 Vigna and Casey, The Age of Cryptocurrency, 84.  
16 Nicolas Christin, “Traveling the Silk Road: A Measurement Analysis of a Large Anonymous 
Online Marketplace,” in Proceedings of the 22nd International Conference on World Wide Web (WWW 
’13) (Rio de Janeiro, Brazil: ACM, 2013), 214.  
17 Christin, 222, 216–218.  
18 Steven Brown, “Cryptocurrency and Criminality: The Bitcoin Opportunity,” The Police Journal: 
Theory, Practice and Principles 89, no. 4 (2016): 336.   
19 Brown, 327–328.  
20 Brown, 328.  
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U.S. resident Ali Amin was prosecuted for providing a “how-to” guide to support IS using 
Bitcoin as the method of finance.21 Similarly, highlighting the Islamic State’s use of bitcoin 
“Sadaqa,” or donations, and an IS linked address worth $3 million, Lewis Sanders argues 
there is a connection between IS and bitcoin.22 Micah Zenko also agrees that 
cryptocurrencies are becoming more widespread among terrorist groups, emphasizing 
recent incidents of illicit transactions like the 2017 transfer of bitcoins to Islamist militants 
in Indonesia.23  
On the other hand, some experts argue that the cryptocurrency-terrorist threat is not 
yet mainstream. Despite a growing number of incidents where terrorist organizations have 
used cryptocurrency as a means of finance, David Manheim et al. write, “[a]t present, 
cryptocurrencies are hardly a go-to solution for terrorist financiers.”24 In their report for 
the RAND Corporation, Baron et al. provide a comprehensive analysis of the methods a 
non-state actor can use virtual currency, including the development, deployment, 
manipulation, and exploitation of virtual currencies to further non-state objectives.25 They 
report that non-state actors face significant hurdles in using or implementing virtual 
currencies, especially when powerful opposing states seek to disrupt them.26 
Like Manheim et al., Yaya Fanusie of the Foundation for Defense of Democracies 
writes that while terrorists have been mostly unsuccessful in their cryptocurrency 
endeavors, they will continue their attempts to use cryptocurrency. In his 2016 article, 
Fanusie found that the Ibn Taymiyya Media Center, an online media organization offering 
explosive training and support for the Islamic State (IS), ran “a social media fundraising 
                                                 
21 William Mendel and Peter McCabe, eds., SOF Role in Combating Transnational Organized Crime 
(MacDill Air Force Base, FL: Joint Special Operations University Press, 2016), http://cco.ndu.edu/ 
Portals/96/Documents/books/JSOU%20SOF/JSOU16_MendelMcCabe_CTOC_final.pdf, 101.  
22 Lewis Sanders, “Bitcoin: Islamic State’s Online Currency Venture,” DW, September 20, 2015, 
http://www.dw.com/en/bitcoin-islamic-states-online-currency-venture/a-18724856.  
23 Micah Zenk, “Bitcoin for Bombs,” Council on Foreign Relations (blog), August 17, 2017, 
https://www.cfr.org/blog/bitcoin-bombs.  
24 David Manheim et al., “Are Terrorists Using Cryptocurrencies?,” Foreign Affairs, April 21, 2017, 
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2017-04-21/are-terrorists-using-cryptocurrencies.  
25 Baron et al., National Security Implications,” 19, 36.  
26 Baron et al., 67.  
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campaign that is the first publicly verifiable instance of a terrorist group using bitcoin.”27 
He later reexamines terrorists’ attempt to use cryptocurrency in his December 2017 article, 
identifying numerous bitcoin “donation” addresses linked to IS and al-Qaeda backed 
groups advertised on both the Internet and Dark Web.28 Moreover, he points out that 
Bitcoin is an attractive means of fundraising because of the assumed anonymity; however, 
the transactions stored on the public ledger provides an easy audit trail that traces the 
donation back to the source.29 Fanusie concludes that while bitcoin “is still not a reliable 
source of funding for jihadists . . . this may change in the future” and points to the future 
potential for the acceptance of a new cryptocurrency offering more privacy or the creation 
of “online [cryptocurrency] exchanges that do not adhere to money laundering laws.”30  
Rogue states seeking to bypass international sanctions have also demonstrated 
capacity to use cryptocurrency. In late 2017, White House Homeland Security Advisor 
Tom Bossert accused North Korea for the 2017 WannaCry ransomware attack, a cyber-
attack that held infected computer systems hostage until the victim sent a payment of 
Bitcoin to a specific bitcoin address.31 Nir Kshetri and Jeff Voas note that North Korea 
earned an estimated 120,000 USD in bitcoin, emphasizing that although most infected 
device users did not pay into the ransomware attack, the propensity for greater ransomware 
attacks using cryptocurrency is likely to increase in the future.32  
Patrick Tucker argues that North Korea’s efforts to use cryptocurrency as an illegal 
source of income extends past simple ransomware attacks. He points out that North Korea 
                                                 
27 Yaya Fanusie, “The New Frontier in Terror Fundraising: Bitcoin,” The Cipher Brief (blog), August 
24, 2016, https://www.thecipherbrief.com/column_article/the-new-frontier-in-terror-fundraising-bitcoin.  
28 Yaya Fanusie, “Terrorist Networks Eye Bitcoin as Cryptocurrency’s Price Rises,” The Cipher Brief 
(blog), December 21, 2017, https://www.thecipherbrief.com/terrorist-networks-eye-bitcoin-
cryptocurrencys-price-rises.  
29 Fanusie.  
30 Fanusie.  
31 Thomas P. Bossert, “It’s Official: North Korea Is behind WannaCry,” Wall Street Journal, 
December 18, 2017, https://www.wsj.com/articles/its-official-north-korea-is-behind-wannacry-
1513642537, sec. Opinion.  
32 Nik Kshetri and Jeff Voas, “Do Crypto-Currencies Fuel Ransomware?,” IT Professional 17, no. 
Sep/Oct 2017 (2017): 3, 6.    
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was able to gain access illegally to South Korean cryptocurrency exchanges in 2017 by 
using phishing emails to obtain log in credentials.33 Tucker states that North Korea can 
transfer the stolen cryptocurrency from the compromised exchange to other exchanges 
worldwide and then exchange the stolen cryptocurrency for more privacy based coins in 
an effort to launder the cryptocurrency, eventually withdrawing the funds in the form of 
fiat like the U.S. dollar or South Korean won. Because of becoming an intermediary 
between cryptocurrency and government backed fiat, Tucker explains, exchanges and their 
owners are under increased scrutiny and face shutdown or arrest for allowing illicit 
activities.34  
The Russian Federation has also shown interest in the creation of a government 
backed cryptocurrency. Olivia Capozzalo writes that the Russian intentions for the 
development could be linked to bypass western sanctions Russia and is currently 
investigating possible implementation strategies using an official government working 
group.35 Like Capozzalo, Shannon Liao is skeptical of Russian intention and sudden 
interest in cryptocurrency, highlighting Vladimir Putin’s decree of five new presidential 
orders on 10 October 2017, which “demanded officials set up a legal framework to handle 
digital currencies … that could solidify cryptocurrency acceptance within the Russian 
Federation.”36 Liao believes the development of the new Russian regulation would 
significantly increase regulations of cryptocurrency within the state, but she cites authors 
who have stated “fostering cryptocurrencies could be a means for Russian official’s to skirt 
sanctions.”37 She concludes that although Russia has a long history of crime and money 
                                                 
33 Patrick Tucker, “Russia, N. Korea Eye Bitcoin for Money Laundering, Putting It on a Crash Course 
with Regulators,” Defense One, December 15, 2017, http://www.defenseone.com/technology/ 
2017/12/russia-n-korea-eye-bitcoin-money-laundering-putting-it-crash-course-regulators/144598/.  
34 Tucker.  
35 Olivia Capozzalo, “Putin Adviser Says ‘CryptoRuble’ Will Circumvent Sanctions, Government 
Remains Divided,” Cointelegraph, January 2, 2018, https://cointelegraph.com/news/putin-adviser-says-
cryptoruble-will-circumvent-sanctions-government-remains-divided.  
36 Shannon Liao, “Inside Russia’s Love-Hate Relationship with Bitcoin,” The Verge, October 31, 
2017, https://www.theverge.com/2017/10/31/16387042/russia-putin-bitcoin-regulation-ethereum-
blockchain-technology.  
37 Liao.  
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laundering, “Russia also stands to legitimately benefit from the legalization of 
cryptocurrency.”38  
Chris Telley is substantially less optimistic on the development of Russian 
cryptocurrency, believing Russia’s development of cryptocurrency laws and a state backed 
cryptocurrency likely has sinister intentions.39 Highlighting Russia’s historical use of 
emerging technology, like social media, to disrupt and influence foreign affairs, Telley 
asserts that the Russian development of cryptocurrency will become another asset in 
Putin’s arsenal of state and economic manipulation aimed at promoting Russian influence 
globally.40 Telley also comments that concerning the existing economic system, “few 
solutions exist to counter the specific capabilities of an adversary cryptocurrency network,” 
and he argues that the United States must urgently move to develop its own capabilities 
within the digital economic environment to protect U.S. national interests in the future.41 
2. U.S. Regulation of Cryptocurrencies 
To understand the options available to sovereign governments like the United States 
to regulate cryptocurrencies, it is worthwhile to examine the literature detailing the 
opinions of scholars on the legal avenues the United States might take. This section 
presents a selection of peer-reviewed sources taking various legal approaches to regulate 
cryptocurrency. The majority of scholars who have studied the cryptocurrency movement 
since its debut believe that the current American legal system has been slow to adapt to the 
fast-moving digital world of virtual currencies and is ill prepared to prosecute illegal 
activity involving cryptocurrency under the existing framework of U.S. laws. Moreover, 
the avenues available to the United States for controlling or preventing illicit 
cryptocurrency use is widely debated among law scholars. As stated by Rainer Bohme et 
al., “a key challenge for prospective regulators is where to impose constraints…. While 
                                                 
38 Liao.  
39 Chris Telley, “A Coin for the Tsar: The Two Disruptive Sides of Cryptocurrency,” Small Wars 
Journal, January 15, 2018, http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/a-coin-for-the-tsar-the-two-disruptive-
sides-of-cryptocurrency.  
40 Telley, 5. 
41 Telley, 5.  
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Bitcoin now appears to be subject to regulatory oversight, the authority of regulators face 
certain limits.”42 For instance, many scholars point to the difficulty of controlling Bitcoin 
within the United States without imposing on citizens’ rights to privacy or unlawful 
searches and seizures.  
One proposal to combat the illicit use of cryptocurrency is to expand the legal 
capability of law enforcement agencies to investigate illicit cryptocurrency use. Alice 
Huang argues that the current federal criminal subpoena standards are ill-equipped to 
prosecute the illicit uses of cryptocurrency, and she proposes enhancing the U.S. judicial 
power to “create a new criminal subpoena standard, modeled from current e-discovery 
laws, that targets criminal Bitcoin use.”43 She also argues that the current subpoena process 
requires the government to “go through millions of transactions and hundreds of thousands 
of user accounts in order to pinpoint specific targets.”44 Finally, she states that increasing 
the subpoena powers could become problematic because the new laws could infringe upon 
users who would want to maintain the anonymity and must therefore be carefully crafted 
to prevent governmental overstep.45 
Similarly, Danton Bryans focuses on the interaction between Bitcoin and anti-
money laundering (AML) laws, stating, “Bitcoin represents a disruptive financial 
technology that many AML and money transmitter statutes are ill prepared to deal with.”46 
Although Bryans asserts, “Bitcoin might be seen as illegal because it attempts to assume 
powers expressly reserved to the federal government under the U.S. Constitution,” he 
believes that emerging cryptocurrencies should continue to exist unhampered to its users.47 
Bryans instead argues that the most effective method of regulation is the regulation of the 
                                                 
42 Rainer Bohme et al., “Bitcoin: Economics, Technology, and Governance,” The Journal of 
Economic Perspectives 29, no. 2 (Spring 2015): 231.  
43 Alice Huang, “Reaching within Silk Road: The Need for a New Subpoena Power That Targets 
Illegal Bitcoin Transactions,” Boston College Law Review 56, no. 5 (December 2015): 2097, 2119–2122.  
44 Huang, 2120.  
45 Huang, 2123–2124.  
46 Danton Bryans, “Bitcoin and Money Laundering: Mining for an Effective Solution,” Indiana Law 
Journal 89, no. 1, Article 13 (2014): 472, https://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/cgi/
viewcontent.cgi?article=11100&context=ilj.  
47 Bryans, 447.  
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fiat-to-cryptocurrency exchanges, since exchanges already fall under existing money 
transmitter laws and require exchange users to identify themselves when they register and 
use exchanges.48  
Like Bryans, Jonathan Turpin believes that the regulation of crypto-exchanges 
would be “the simplest and most likely route.”49 Turpin writes that transactions using 
Bitcoin are not illegal but “operate in a legal gray area…. [where] no U.S. law currently on 
the books explicitly applies to Bitcoin.”50 Due to the international applicability of using 
Bitcoin as a currency, he believes that Bitcoin will continue to grow unless the world 
governments move to regulate cryptocurrency; however, he recommends against an 
outright external restriction on cryptocurrencies. Turpin instead offers that the “wisest 
approach that governments might take to Bitcoin is to attempt to regulate the transactions 
that take place in Bitcoin (BTC), rather than the system itself,” arguing that a method of 
regulation inside of the blockchain would be far more effective than external regulation.51 
Omri Marian offers a unique, less invasive solution a state could implement to 
regulate bitcoin-like cryptocurrencies, which incorporate a visible public ledger.52 
Marian’s conceptual framework exploits the cryptocurrencies’ public ledger—wherein 
every historical transaction is compiled—as a means of tracking licit and illicit 
cryptocurrency transactions. He argues that if the government were to enact an “elective 
anonymity tax” that enforces high taxes on merchants who transact in cryptocurrency with 
unknown users but offers tax relief to transactions with preidentified users, cryptocurrency 
users would be incentivized to register their identity.53 As a result, customers who have 
been verified for the tax relief would reveal their identity through the process of associating 
                                                 
48 Bryans.   
49 Jonathan Turpin, “Bitcoin: The Economic Case for a Global, Virtual Currency Operating in an 
Unexplored Legal Framework,” Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies 21, no. 1 (2014): 364.  
50 Turpin, 352–353.  
51 Turpin, 367.  
52 Omri Marian, “A Conceptual Framework for the Regulation of Cryptocurrencies,” University Of 
Chicago Law Review 82, no. 53 (2015): 55–68, https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/facultypub/695/.   
53 Marian, 63–64.  
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a name to their digital wallet, providing the businesses and regulatory bodies with a history 
of all transactions to and from that user.  
Marian’s proposed system has the unique advantage of permitting anonymous users 
to continue to use cryptocurrency to transact under regulation at the penalty of an additional 
financial fee imposed by the marketplace. He argues that law-abiding citizens will have no 
need to conceal their identity, and when these citizens are presented with the financial 
benefits of registration, they will register en masse, making the entire cryptocurrency 
network less anonymous while highlighting illicit transactions.54 Marian concludes, 
“under such a framework, legitimate users [will] passively participate in regulatory efforts 
to prevent illicit behavior.”55 
3. International Regulatory Propositions to Regulate Cryptocurrencies 
The opinions of those debating the regulation of cryptocurrency in the international 
community fall on a spectrum between international oversight and adoption. On one end, 
the critics of cryptocurrency argue that cryptocurrencies threaten the existing financial 
order and state security and therefore need to be heavily regulated or prohibited through a 
framework of international governments. The cryptoanarchists and cypherpunks are on the 
other extreme, and they argue that the technology herald within the cryptocurrency 
movement will force political, financial, or social revolutions in the governments of the 
world. These opinions are both extreme, and the vast majority of scholarly views argue for 
minor regulation of cryptocurrency rather than prohibition and revolution.  
Fiammetta Piazza believes that regulating cryptocurrency requires a coordination 
between international organizations to set the minimum for cryptocurrency regulation for 
sovereign states. She writes, “Given Bitcoin’s great potential of being exploited not only 
by financial criminals but also Dark Web traffickers, an international agreement should be 
implemented.”56 Additionally, she argues that governments will need to establish 
                                                 
54 Marian, 63.  
55 Marian, 63–64.  
56 Fiammetta Piazza, “Bitcoin in the Dark Web: A Shadow over Banking Secrecy and a Call for 
Global Response,” Southern California Interdisciplinary Law Journal 26, no. 3 (2017): 545.  
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minimum international standards of registration that would lessen the anonymity in 
cryptocurrency but provide individual nations with the sovereign right to increase the 
regulation of cryptocurrencies as they see fit.57 According to Piazza, these standards would 
“render Bitcoin less attractive to both Web and Dark Web criminals.”58  
Nicholas Plassaras proposes that cryptocurrencies need to be reined in 
internationally through the International Monetary Fund (IMF), stating Bitcoin “poses an 
increasingly serious threat to the stability of the foreign currency exchange market and, by 
extension, international commerce.”59 He believes that when cryptocurrencies like Bitcoin 
gain worldwide adoption, they can be used as a “speculative attack” on foreign currency 
and destabilize nations.60 To counter Bitcoin’s threat of a speculative attack, Plassaras 
offers two solutions. First, the IMF could require member countries to purchase and 
contribute a percentage of bitcoins as part of each country’s required quota, thereby 
allowing the IMF to counter a Bitcoin speculative attack and stabilize individual 
countries.61 Second, the IMF could simply purchase its own supply of bitcoins to be placed 
in reserve should a speculative attack occur.62  
While Plassaras is not alone in his fear of cryptocurrency’s disruption of the 
international financial system, the IMF’s leadership dismisses the risks of virtual currency 
to the international financial order. In a speech to the Bank of England, the IMF managing 
director, Christine Lagarde, states,”[f]or now, virtual currencies such as Bitcoin pose little 
or no challenge to the existing order of fiat currencies… because they are too volatile, too 
risky, too energy intensive,… and not yet scalable.”63 Similarly, the IMF’s book Digital 
                                                 
57 Piazza, 545–46.  
58 Piazza, 545–46.  
59 Nicholas Plassaras, “Regulating Digital Currencies: Bringing Bitcoin within the Reach of the IMF,” 
Chicago Journal of International Law 14, no. 1, article 12 (2013): 396.  
60 Plassaras, 398–400.  
61 Plassaras, 402–405.  
62 Plassaras, 406.  
63 Christine Lagarde, “Central Banking and Fintech—A Brave New World?” (speech at Bank of 
England Conference, London, September 29, 2017), https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/ 
2017/09/28/sp092917-central-banking-and-fintech-a-brave-new-world.  
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Revolutions in Public Finance offers a similar conclusion by dismissing the potential 
destabilizing effect of cryptocurrency adoption, proposing that blockchain is a tool for 
countries to amplify their respective capabilities of fiat currencies and data tracking.64  
However, the emergence of distributed ledger cryptocurrencies, like Bitcoin, has 
also gained the attention of the Bank for International Settlements (BIS). The report on 
digital currencies produced by the BIS’s Committee on Payments and Market 
Infrastructures (CPMI) provides a detailed analysis of potential benefits and drawbacks 
that digital distributed ledger currencies offer as a method of transaction.65 The report also 
provides a list of potential regulatory actions a state or its central bank can take to control 
or weaken cryptocurrencies, and it analyzes a list of countries that have applied virtual 
currency regulations current to 2015.66 https://libguides.nps.edu/citation/rules-chicago-nb 
Paul Vigna and Michael Casey argue that Bitcoin will not tear down the existing 
Westphalian order upon which the world economy is built but instead will become a 
challenger and provide the “banking state . . . [with] some much-needed competition and 
discipline forced upon it.”67 They explain there are three obstacles that Bitcoin, or any 
other cryptocurrency, must surmount to achieve the goal of widespread adoption. First, 
Bitcoin is stifled with the rocky history of scams and illegal activity, and its price tends to 
be volatile. Second, the deflationary nature of Bitcoin promotes hoarding over spending, 
and if adopted over the existing inflationary financial system, it could create another “Great 
Depression.”68 Finally, if preexisting trusted companies developed their own direct 
competitor to Bitcoin with nearly the same benefits, consumers would likely prefer the 
trusted name-brand companies resulting in a decrease use of Bitcoin.  
                                                 
64 Sanjeev Gupta et al., Digital Revolutions In Public Finance (Washington, DC: International 
Monetary Fund, 2017), 173–196.  
65 Committee on Payments and Market Infrastructures, Digital Currencies (Basel, Switzerland: Bank 
for International Settlements, 2015), https://www.bis.org/cpmi/publ/d137.pdf.  
66 Committee on Payments and Market Infrastructures, Digital Currencies, 12–13.  
67 Vigna and Casey, The Age of Cryptocurrency, 311.  
68 Vigna and Casey, 294.  
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D. POTENTIAL EXPLANATIONS  
Sovereign states have a host of legislative actions available to them to control 
cryptocurrencies; however, each state has unique challenges to implementing and 
enforcing these options. One potential challenge to applying laws on cryptocurrency is a 
state’s capability to actually enforce policy against cryptocurrency, since cryptocurrency 
creation and transactions promote anonymity and complicates the identification and 
prosecution of offenders. Another probable challenge of a sovereign state control is if the 
legislation regarding cryptocurrency is compatible in the international community. In other 
words, a policy administering a total ban of cryptocurrency might be unenforceable if a 
host of other geographically near, or economically influential nations, permit the use of 
cryptocurrency by citizens.  
From the ideas proposed by the authors in this thesis’s literature review, it appears 
that the state and international financial institutions have three broad—but not separate—
options available to control cryptocurrency. The three options are to ban cryptocurrency 
use; to instill regulations to control cryptocurrency use at level of the exchange or user; and 
to adopt cryptocurrencies as an accepted means of transaction. This thesis expounds upon 
the three options to determine what policies states could implement to control 
cryptocurrency and restrict illicit transactions as well as the incurring challenges and 
drawbacks of each action. 
E. RESEARCH DESIGN 
To achieve a comprehensive analysis of the methods that sovereign states and 
international institutions could take to regulate cryptocurrency, this thesis surveys a 
combination of the available scholarly literature and historical incidents of government 
restrictions on cryptocurrency to draw conclusions about how effective controls on 
cryptocurrency are. This thesis does this by separating the potential avenues of controlling 
cryptocurrency into three groups (regulation, ban, and adoption) and analyzing methods of 
how the state and international community could implement controls.  
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F. THESIS OVERVIEW AND DRAFT CHAPTER OUTLINE 
The first chapter of this thesis consists of the thesis question and its importance, the 
literature review, and chapter outline. The second chapter is dedicated to describing the 
functionality of cryptocurrency, including the innovative technology that makes it an 
attractive method of transaction. Also, this chapter dissects blockchain technology into its 
key parts as a means to present the advantages, disadvantages and weaknesses inherent in 
blockchain based cryptocurrency.  
It is this thesis’s goal to analyze the potential impact that cryptocurrency has on the 
state’s sovereignty and they methods the state and international institutions could take to 
manage cryptocurrency implementation. To do this, this thesis divides the potential actions 
a state may take into the last three chapters, Chapter III Banning Cryptocurrency, Chapter 
IV Regulating Cryptocurrency, and Chapter V Adopting Cryptocurrency. Chapter III 
focuses on listing the potential methods that states may take to regulate cryptocurrency and 
analyzes each method’s effectiveness. Chapter IV lists and analyzes how different levels 
of a ban on cryptocurrency could affect a state’s capability to prevent illicit activity and the 
consequences resulting from extreme measures. Chapter V discusses the possible 
implementation of cryptocurrency, either currently existing or those developed in the 
future, and the resulting impact that a government backed cryptocurrency could have on 
the international economic system. This thesis concludes with the analysis of each avenue 
the state and international community may take, as well as this thesis’s opinion and ideas 
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II. CRYPTOCURRENCIES AND THE BLOCKCHAIN 
To really understand what is special about Bitcoin, we need to understand 
how it works at a technical level. 
—Narayanan et al.69 
While this thesis focuses on the actions a state may take to manipulate and regulate 
cryptocurrencies, this chapter covers the relevant terminology, technology, concepts, and 
mechanics of cryptocurrencies. Additionally, this chapter provides the reader with the 
foundation of cryptocurrency knowledge that this thesis draws upon later and references 
when discussing the possibility of prohibition, regulation, or adoption of cryptocurrencies 
by state governments. However, it is important to note the limitations and constraints of 
this chapter.  
There are many design elements of Bitcoin not covered in this thesis due to 
constraints of the length and detail. Many of the concepts and technologies utilized by 
Bitcoin are extremely complex—and far outside the scope of this thesis—therefore this 
chapter provides the requisite amount of information to explain the Bitcoin ecosystem 
without extending past the question asked in this thesis. This chapter examines Bitcoin 
exclusively due to Bitcoin’s popularity, market value, and abundance of published 
material; however, the technical discussion in this chapter applies to other cryptocurrencies 
as well.70  
Another distinction is the difference between the phrases of “digital currencies,” 
“virtual currencies,” “decentralized virtual currencies,” and “cryptocurrencies.” To 
simplify the dissimilarity between them, this chapter offers the following assumptions 
exclusive to this thesis but may have exceptions in outside literature. As indicated in the 
literature reviewed in this thesis, there is no established preference of terms in use. The 
most common terms observed in regulatory literature are the phrases of “digital currency” 
                                                 
69 Narayanan et al., Bitcoin and Cryptocurrency Technologies, preface.  
70 CoinMarketCap, “Cryptocurrency Market Capitalizations.” At the time of writing this thesis, 
Bitcoin has the greatest market value of any cryptocurrency in USD per-coin, as well as being the first 
cryptocurrency ever adopted as a form of payment.  
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and “virtual currencies (VCs),” which can be used interchangeably as a blanket phrase 
under which to group all electronic currencies. Similarly, Eswar Prasad defines digital 
currency in his report as a “broad term that encompasses any form of currency that is not 
tangible.”71  
On the other hand, cryptocurrencies are virtual currencies that specifically rely on 
cryptographic proof, and can be centralized, or decentralized.72 Decentralized virtual 
currencies (DVC) are specifically decentralized digital currencies and may or may not be 
cryptocurrencies. For example, Bitcoin is considered both a cryptocurrency and a DVC. 
Because delineating between the terms can become confusing, this thesis adheres to the 
syllogism all cryptocurrencies are digital currencies; however, not all digital currencies are 
cryptocurrencies. 
To explain the key parts of Bitcoin and to avoid confusion, this chapter builds upon 
the distinction Vigna and Casey use in their 2015 book, The Age of Cryptocurrency, to 
differentiate the Bitcoin technology from the currency.73 They write that the word Bitcoin 
written with a capital “B” refers to the Bitcoin technology, system, or network; meanwhile, 
stating bitcoin with a lowercase “b” will reference the currency.  
This chapter is organized into four sections; the first section discusses the 
relationship between trust and Bitcoin and why users can trust it without needing a 
governing body. The second section details the security and capabilities provided to Bitcoin 
by cryptographic functions and the blockchain. The third section outlines the Bitcoin 
network, the responsibilities of miners and nodes, and how transactions are stored on the 
blockchain. The fourth and final section discusses the security within a virtual wallet, 
storing and transacting with bitcoins, cryptocurrency exchanges, the bitcoin ecosystem, 
and a brief discussion of cryptocurrencies other than Bitcoin.  
                                                 
71 Eswar Prasad, Central Banking in a Digital Age: Stock-Taking and Preliminary Thoughts 
(Washington, DC: Hutchins Center on Fiscal and Monetary Policy at Brookings, 2018), 
https://www.brookings.edu/research/how-will-fintech-and-digital-currencies-transform-central-banking, 5.  
72 The concepts of “cryptographic proof,” “centralized,” and “decentralized” currencies is discussed 
later in the chapter.  
73 Vigna and Casey, The Age of Cryptocurrency, 9.  
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A. BITCOIN AND “TRUST”  
The concept of trust is an essential to any currency’s adoption as a form of money. 
Under the classical model of fiat currency, the state builds and sustains public trust in the 
currency through the use of anticounterfeiting technology, central banks, third-party 
verification, and enforcement agencies to prevent cheating or tampering with the system. 
However, cryptocurrencies like Bitcoin promote a system of currency radically differing 
from traditional government backed fiat. As Vigna and Casey argue, “[f]or any currency 
to be viable, be it a decentralized cryptocurrency issued by computer program or a 
traditional “fiat” currency issued by a government, it must win the trust of the people.”74 
On the other hand, Bitcoin is not controlled by any government, organization, or person 
and must approach the dilemma of trust without the aforementioned tools available to state 
backed currency.  
The design of Bitcoin is a departure from prior models of currency because Bitcoin 
purposely replaced the requirement for trusted third parties, instead instilling confidence 
in the currency through the reliance on virtually impervious mathematical functions. The 
pseudonymous founder of Bitcoin, Satoshi Nakamoto, acknowledges the challenges of the 
Bitcoin. He recognizes that prior to Bitcoin, “no mechanism [has existed] to make payment 
over a communication channel without a trusted third party.”75 To conquer the problem of 
removing the middleman from transactions, Nakamoto proposed the Bitcoin whitepaper, a 
“peer-to-peer electronic cash system that uses ... cryptographic proof instead of trust” in 
financial institutions.76 Vigna and Casey contend, “cryptocurrency systems imbue trust in 
an inviolable, decentralized computer program that is, in theory, incapable of defrauding 
people.”77  
Some writers define cryptocurrencies as trustless; however, this is not the case. As 
Narayanan et al. note that the Bitcoin protocol is not trustless, but strives for a system of 
                                                 
74 Vigna and Casey, 15.  
75 Nakamoto, “Bitcoin: A Peer-to-Peer Electronic Cash System,” 1.  
76 Nakamoto, 1.  
77 Vigna and Casey, The Age of Cryptocurrency, 15.  
 22 
“trust minimalization” to reduce the maximum amount of trust required of a currency to 
function.78 Similarly, Vigna and Casey state 
The simple genius of this technology is that it cuts away the middleman yet 
maintains an infrastructure that allows strangers to deal with each other. It 
does this by taking the all-important role of ledger-keeping away from 
centralized financial institutions and handing it to a network of autonomous 
computers, creating a decentralized system of trust that operates outside the 
control of any one institution.79 
Bitcoin has removed many of the third party and regulatory bodies from its framework 
without removing trust. The replacement of trust is a key to why Bitcoin and other 
cryptocurrencies offer a viable and attractive alternative to the conventional model of 
government backed fiat.  
B. SECURITY IN BITCOIN: HASH FUNCTIONS, MERKLE TREES, AND 
THE BLOCKCHAIN 
What is a cryptocurrency? Narayanan et al. identify the word “cryptocurrency” as 
a combination “cryptographic” and “currency,” wherein the “use of cryptography provides 
a mechanism for securely encoding the rules of a cryptocurrency system within the system 
itself.”80 Bitcoin’s choice of cryptographic functions is the hash function, a cryptologic 
function that is used in Bitcoin to build many of the more complex data structures 
guaranteeing the security of the protocol. 
Hash functions are important to discuss for two reasons. First, Bitcoin relies on the 
functionality and the output generated by the cryptographic hash to create many of the 
Bitcoin data structures, such as the Merkle tree, blockchain, mining, and the virtual wallet, 
each described in turn in the following text.81 The second reason this chapter discusses the 
hash function is because cryptographic hashes are inherently robust in securing 
information, so that an adversary who wants to disrupt or manipulate the data contained in 
                                                 
78 Narayanan et al., Bitcoin and Cryptocurrency Technologies, 280.  
79 Vigna and Casey, The Age of Cryptocurrency, 5. The terms “decentralization” and “ledger” are 
explained later in this chapter.  
80 Narayanan et al., Bitcoin and Cryptocurrency Technologies, 1.  
81 Narayanan et al., 1.  
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a hash output could neither view the contents, nor the alter data inside without showing 
that someone tampered with the hash.82 Narayanan et al. define the purpose of hash 
functions “to prevent tampering and equivocation, as well as to encode, in a mathematical 
protocol, the rules for creation of new units of currency.”83 More importantly, 
cryptographically secure hash functions operate in one direction from input to output and 
cannot be unhashed by knowing the output. 
All hashes are not the same, and to consider a hash function cryptographically 
secure, the hash must exhibit the three properties of collision resistance, hiding, and puzzle 
friendliness.84 A collision occurs in a cryptographic function when two different imputs 
result in the same output. There are collisions for every hash function, regardless of its 
strength; therefore, a hash is considered collision resistant when it is virtually impossible 
to find a collision.85 One reason why collision resistant hash functions are useful, 
particularly in the blockchain, is because they act as a summary of the input data, called a 
digest.86 Best stated by Narayanan et al., a cryptographic hash is “a very efficient way to 
remember things [a user has] seen before and to recognize them again.”87 The second 
property of cryptograhically secure hash functions is hiding. Simiplified for this thesis, 
hiding is achieved when the hash function secures the input data in such a way that an 
adversary can not guess the input data, even with knowledge of the output.88 Puzzle 
friendliness—again, shortened for the purpose of this chapter—occurs when no known 
systematic method exists that would discover the input of a hash function faster than 
random guesswork.89  
                                                 
82 Narayanan et al., 2–9.  
83 Narayanan et al., 1.  
84 Narayanan et al., 2.   
85 Narayanan et al. use a 256-bit hash as an example of collision resistance, stating, “if every computer 
made by humanity had been computing since the beginning of the universe, the odds that they would have 
found a collision by now are still infinitesimally small,” Narayanan et al., 3–4.  
86 Narayanan et al., 5.  
87 Narayanan et al., 5.  
88 Narayanan et al., 5.  
89 Narayanan et al., 8.  
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The majority of the Bitcoin protocol utilizes the particularly strong hash function 
of secure hash algorithm (SHA)-256,90 which is described as virtually uncrackable unless 
the source of the information is already known.91 The SHA-256 output presents itself as a 
fixed-length digest or an alphanumeric string that is 64 characters in length, regardless of 
the size input into the hash function.92 For example, Vigna and Casey demonstrate that 
when one runs the entire contents of War and Peace and then a separate 13-word phrase 
through a SHA-256 generator, both of the outputs result in a 64 character string unique to 
their contents.93 An example of a SHA-256 output is in Figure 1.  
 
Figure 1.  A SHA256 Hash Generated from the Phrase 
“Naval Postgraduate School”94 
The two hash-based data structures this chapter discusses are the block chain and 
the Merkle tree. As the word implies, the blockchain consists of multiple blocks of 
information chained together via a hash function (see Figure 2). Narayanan et al. further 
break down the components within each block, explaining, the “block chain [is] a clever 
combination of two different hash-based data structures. The first is a hash chain of blocks, 
                                                 
90 As 3blue1brown estimates in his video, using the computing power as of the video’s production in 
2017, to receive a 1-in-4 billion chance that SHA256 protection would be cracked over a period of 507 
billion years, it would require four billion galaxies each filled with four billion planets, each planet 
containing four billion people, and with each person armed with the entire estimated processing power of 
all google servers combined with graphic processing units that are dedicated to cracking one specific 
SHA256 digest string. “How Secure Is 256 Bit Security?” YouTube video, 5:05, posted by 3blue1brown, 
July 8, 2017, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=S9JGmA5_unY&t=71s.  
91 Narayanan et al., Bitcoin and Cryptocurrency Technologies, 110.  
92 Narayanan et al., 5.  
93 Vigna and Casey, The Age of Cryptocurrency, 129.  
94 Source: “SHA256 Hash Generator,” Password Generator, accessed April 29, 2018, 
https://passwordsgenerator.net/sha256-hash-generator/. To generate the same hash, type in “Naval 
Postgraduate School” exactly as written.  
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[and] ... the second data structure is a per-block [Merkle] tree of all transactions included 
in the block.”95 
 
Figure 2.  The Hash Structure of the Block Chain and Merkle Tree96 
The purpose of the Merkle tree is to protect the data stored in each block of Bitcoin 
from tampering. Narayanan et al. states that the Merkle tree in Bitcoin groups “data blocks 
into pairs of two, and then for each pair ... [builds] a data structure that has two has pointers, 
one to each of the blocks.”97 The process then repeats with the newly created data structure 
placed into another pair of two, repeating until the information reaches a single block, 
called the Merkle root.98 According to Narayanan et al., since the Merkle tree is connected 
by hash pointers, “any attempt to tamper with any piece of data will be detected by just 
remembering the hash pointer at the top.”99 A visual depiction of the Merkle tree is found 
in the bottom half of Figure 2.  
                                                 
95 Narayanan et al., Bitcoin and Cryptocurrency Technologies, 64. 
96 Source: Suraj Kumar, “Merkle Trees—Introduction to Blockchain,” December 10, 2017, 
https://medium.com/@skj48817/merkle-trees-introduction-to-blockchain-c80c0247046.  
97 Narayanan et al., Bitcoin and Cryptocurrency Technologies, 13. 
98 “SHA256 Hash Generator.” 
99 Narayanan et al., Bitcoin and Cryptocurrency Technologies, 13.  
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The second hash-based data structure this chapter discusses is the blockchain. Much 
like the Merkle tree’s protection of data within each individual block, the blockchain 
protects and links the most current block to each previous block, consequently protecting 
all of the historical Bitcoin data. The official website of the Bitcoin Core developers, 
Bitcoin.org, describes how the construction of the blockchain, stating  
The merkle root is stored in the block header. Each block also stores the 
hash of the previous block’s header, chaining the blocks together. This 
ensures a transaction cannot be modified without modifying the block that 
records it and all following blocks.100  
The data stored within a blockchain can be any piece of information that a 
developer wishes to protect; however, in the case of Bitcoin, the data stored are the account 
balances of every bitcoin user in a system called a public ledger. Vigna and Casey explain, 
“The payee no longer has to trust ‘third-party’ institutions such as banks or governments 
to assure that the payer can deliver the agreed-upon funds.”101 A major benefit of storing 
the public ledger in the blockchain is that Bitcoin secures the information in a way that 
allows Bitcoin to self-police, thereby eliminating the problem of counterfeiting and 
providing an answer to the problem of double spending.102  
C. DECENTRALIZED PUBLIC LEDGER AND THE BITCOIN NETWORK: 
MINING AND NODES 
The concept of decentralization is critical to the trust model of Bitcoin because 
decentralization allows access to the public ledger without the need for third parties (see 
Figure 3). Vigna and Casey write that traditionally, fiat “[m]onetary systems have been 
built on centralized ledger keeping” or a system wherein third parties are trusted to 
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maintain a record of monetary balances and are the solitary point of query for information 
on a user’s account balance.103  
 
Figure 3.  Visual Differences between Centralized, Decentralized, 
and Distributed Networks.104 
However, Bitcoin achieves decentralization through the Bitcoin network consisting of 
individual miners and nodes that maintain copies of the public ledger worldwide.105 This 
reflects a concept known as the decentralized public ledger. Any person who wants to join 
the Bitcoin network can turn her or his computer into a node or mining machine by 
downloading the Bitcoin protocol software onto a computer meeting the minimum 
hardware requirements and connect the computer to the Internet.106 In addition to 
perpetuating the public ledger, the Bitcoin nodes and miners are responsible for a number 
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of other tasks, including the verification and distribution of new transactions and 
prevention of hostile manipulation to the network.  
Bitcoin nodes listen for new transactions on the network and propagate transactions 
to other nodes. To this end, each Bitcoin node institutes an independent check of any new 
transaction data to maintain the stability of the network. According to Narayanan et al., 
these checks, verify the transactions are valid in the blockchain, ensure the bitcoins in 
transactions have not already been spent (through double spending), ignore transactions 
that have already been seen by the node so that they are rebroadcasted, and ensure 
transactions are accepted according to a whitelist of scripts.107 Nodes complete these tasks 
by sending and receiving network data to other nodes and miners around the world in a 
process that grows the Bitcoin blockchain and propagates transactions.  
Like the nodes, Bitcoin miners have an important role in the Bitcoin network and 
are responsible for three functions pertinent to this thesis: continuing the blockchain by 
finding valid blocks, validating transactions that have been sent through the network, and 
providing consensus. Bitcoin miners find valid blocks by placing the pending transactions, 
which have been propagated via the nodes, into a block that will become validated as a part 
of the blockchain.108 However, the process of finding a valid block is not solved but 
guessed, and moreover, it is mathematically unlikely that two separate miners are working 
on an identical approach to find blocks.109  
This process of finding valid blocks is described in Bitcoin’s terminology as 
mining, a phrase that Narayanan et al. compares to the mining the mineral gold due to the 
randomness and luck involved in the process.110 As a result of the stochasticity of finding 
new valid blocks, mining Bitcoins becomes a system of chance and luck.111 Mining is 
monitored autonomously by the Bitcoin protocol and altered accordingly so that blocks are 
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made at an approximately steady rate. Bitcoin incorporates an algorithm that alters the 
difficulty of solving the next block based on the computing power of the entire Bitcoin 
network to ensure that new blocks are not created any slower or faster than roughly every 
10 minutes.112 Mining Bitcoin is considered competitive because even though there may 
be a huge number of computers worldwide dedicated to mining, there can only be one 
validated block found and rewarded in each interval.113 
Miners are also responsible for finding a consensus in the blockchain through a 
mechanism called proof-of-work. By searching for the next valid block, miners also verify 
the last known distributed valid block in the network. Because the Bitcoin network is peer-
to-peer and distributed throughout the globe, and there can only be one valid Bitcoin 
blockchain, Bitcoin miners seek to validate the longest chain available in a process called 
distributed consensus.114 As long as a simple majority of miners and nodes in the network 
are honest in a distributed consensus, the blockchain is protected from malicious actors that 
seek to disrupt the network.115 
Miners are incentivized to mine Bitcoin through two established system of rewards 
provided through the Bitcoin protocol. The first incentive and largest payoff for miners is 
the block reward. Since there are many miners competing to find the next valid block at an 
interval of every 10 minutes, the block reward essentially becomes “a payment to the 
[miner] in exchange for the service of creating a block on the consensus chain.”116 In 
addition to incentivizing miners to mine Bitcoin, block rewards also act as Bitcoin’s only 
coin creation process by adding bitcoins at an established rate to add the total worldwide 
supply of the currency.117  
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The second incentive for mining Bitcoin are transaction fees. When a transaction is 
made with bitcoin, a small transaction fee is also included. The miner who first places that 
transaction into a block that is included on the blockchain receives that transaction fee as 
payment for his or her service.118  
Mining Bitcoin can be rather profitable. For example, in early March 2018, miners 
who found new blocks were given a block reward of 12.5 bitcoins, a total reward worth 
approximately 137,500 USD.119 However, the supply of remaining bitcoins rewards is 
decreasing. Of the 21 million bitcoins that will ever be mined, only 20 percent remain.120 
As a result, mining has become a competitive business, and professional mining centers 
filled with computers dedicated to the Bitcoin mining process have been popping up around 
the globe.121 These sophisticated mining centers are hundreds of thousands of times more 
efficient than the average household computers and have a much higher probability of 
finding the blocks; however, these centers have come at a cost to the Bitcoin ecosystem.  
As discussed before, the Bitcoin protocol consistently increases the difficulty of 
finding new blocks so even with advances in computer efficiency and capabilities, 
computers still need to work harder to mine Bitcoins. As a consequence, large mining 
facilities require a significant amount of energy to operate, generate a large amount of heat, 
and have corresponding ecological impacts in the form of damage to the environment.122  
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D. TRANSACTING WITH BITCOIN: VIRTUAL WALLETS, 
CRYPTOCURRENCY EXCHANGES, THE BITCOIN ECOSYSTEM, AND 
OTHER CRYPTOCURRENCIES 
This section of the chapter builds upon the previously discussed information in this 
chapter to outline the digital aspects of cryptocurrency that provide anonymity to the user, 
access to value stored in the blockchain, and the cryptocurrency ecosystem which has 
developed since Bitcoin’s release. 
1. Virtual Wallets and Transactions 
To transact with bitcoin, a user must first create a virtual wallet. A virtual wallet is 
software with a digital address that allows access to the Bitcoin blockchain for purchases, 
transfers, and store of bitcoins.123 It would be a misnomer if a person was to say that he or 
she “sent” or “receive bitcoins” to a virtual wallet. During transactions, bitcoins are not 
sent to individual wallets—in actuality, bitcoins are not sent anywhere—but instead they 
are permanently listed on the blockchain’s public ledger, noting that a bitcoins balance 
transfer has occurred.124  
Virtual wallets are comprised of two hash outputs of 64-digit strings (see Figure 1.) 
which make up the public key and secret key. The virtual wallet allows Bitcoin users’ 
identities to considered pseudonymous, because buyers and sellers are only identified by 
their public wallet address; moreover, a user is not restrained to a single wallet may choose 
to create an unlimited amount of wallets.125 Narayanan et al. note that the public key acts 
as the “identity of a person or an actor in a system . . . [and] the consequence of treating 
public keys as identities is that you can make a new identity whenever you want.”126  
The secret key acts like a secret signature, which Narayanan et al. describe as 
“existentially unforgeable.”127 The private key’s role is to verify the public key and to 
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validate the transaction by the sender; therefore, for a transaction to occur, a sender of 
bitcoin must know the public and private key of the wallet she or he wishes to send from 
and the public identity of the recipient.128 A visual of a transaction chain is depicted in 
Figure 4 from the original Bitcoin whitepaper.129 The drawback of this system is that if 
malicious actors gain access to a linked public and private key, they can steal the identity 
of their victim as well as the entire balance of bitcoins out of the compromised wallet.130  
 
Figure 4.  A Chain of Transactions Depicting the Ownership of  
Bitcoins with Public Keys and Private Keys131 
Since virtual wallets are simply the combination of a private and public key 
providing access to the Bitcoin public ledger, the wallet can be stored either online, 
digitally on a computer, or completely separate from a computer on a piece of paper or 
physical device.132 According to Narayanan et al., each of these methods offers its own 
advantages and disadvantages regarding availability, security, and convenience; however, 
the downside to all methods of storing bitcoin is that if a user loses or forgets his private 
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key, the user will lose access to his bitcoins.133 When a user loses or forgets his or her 
private key, the bitcoins stored in that wallet become lost, unrecoverable or unspent and 
still apart of the total bitcoin supply. Lost bitcoins are somewhat common, and Roberts and 
Rapp, estimate there are nearly 4 million bitcoins or 23 percent of the total mined bitcoins 
that are lost forever.134 
However, Bitcoin transactions are not completely anonymous and can still be 
tracked. Narayanan et al. explain 
Linking a bitcoin address to real-world identities is often easy. If you 
interact with Bitcoin business—be it an online wallet service, exchange or 
other types of merchant—they usually want your real-world identity for 
transactions with them. For example, an exchange might require your credit 
card details, or a merchant will need your shipping address.135 
Since the blockchain maintains a public historical record of every bitcoin transaction that 
has ever occurred, an entity like law enforcement could easily track the flow of bitcoins 
between known public addresses.136 The true challenge of tracking the flow of bitcoins 
lies with linking addresses to real-world identities.  
2. Bitcoin Exchanges and the Cryptocurrency Ecosystem 
According to Bitcoin.org, an individual may acquire bitcoins through purchase at a 
Bitcoin exchange, as a transaction for goods or services, through mining Bitcoins, and by 
exchanging fiat to bitcoins with another individual.137 This chapter has already discussed 
mining, virtual wallets, and how to transact with bitcoins; this section focuses on the 
cryptocurrency exchanges. 
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Bitcoin exchanges, if legal in the individual’s country, are arguably the easiest way 
to obtain bitcoins for fiat currency. Narayanan et al. describe  
Bitcoin exchanges are businesses that—at least from the user interface 
standpoint—function in a similar way to banks. They accept deposits of 
bitcoins and will, just like a bank, promise to give them back on demand 
later. . . . You can also exchange bitcoins for fiat currency or vice versa. ... 
the big [advantage] is that exchanges help connect the Bitcoin economy and 
the flows of bitcoins with the fiat currency economy, so that it’s easy to 
transfer value back and forth.138  
Because cryptocurrency exchanges operate as private businesses, they are subject to the 
laws and regulations of the exchanges host nation. For example, a popular U.S. 
cryptocurrency exchange is Coinbase, which is based in San Francisco and available to 32 
countries worldwide but subject to U.S. regulation.139 If an individual would like to obtain 
bitcoin through Coinbase, she or he would first need to register with the company and then 
use a wire transfer, credit card, or bank account to exchange U.S. dollars for bitcoins.  
Contrary to some opinions, Bitcoin is not a Ponzi or pyramid scheme. The currency 
obtains its value through the economic principles of supply and demand. As Bitcoin 
Magazine states, “Bitcoin derives its unique value from the fact that despite its lack of 
official backing or wide acceptance, it has generated an ecosystem in which many people 
are willing to trade and accept it.”140 As a consequence of this system, the price of a single 
bitcoin often fluctuates and is considered volatile since the value of the cryptocurrency is 
not fixed to any physical commodity like gold is or guaranteed by any country.  
Since the inception of Bitcoin, the cryptocurrency has had varying levels of 
acceptance worldwide as a currency. Vigna and Casey point out that major merchants have 
accepted Bitcoin as a form of payment, including “Overstock.com, the Sacramento Kings 
basketball team, Dell computers, and the travel site Expedia” for example and “sixty-seven 
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thousand [other] merchants by the end of June 2014.”141 In addition to major retailers 
accepting bitcoin, every day users can interact, exchange, and store wealth in bitcoin via 
Bitcoin ATMs.142 Bitcoin ATMs operate much in the same manner as bank ATMs, only 
that instead of transacting solely with a bank, a customer can also exchange wealth in the 
form of credit or debit cards from or into the Bitcoin blockchain. As of March 2018, there 
are 2648 Bitcoin ATMs worldwide in dozens of countries.143 
3. Other Cryptocurrencies  
Since the conception of Bitcoin, numerous other cryptocurrencies have emerged, 
each with their own unique approach as a type of currency. These alternative 
cryptocurrencies, or altcoins, can transact and trade on exchanges much of the same ways 
that Bitcoin can and have their own values separate from Bitcoin based on supply and 
demand.144 Examples of other popular altcoins at the time of writing based on the total 
market capitalization of each coin include Ethereum, Litecoin, Ripple, and Bitcoin Cash 
(Bcash).145  
Altcoins may have different properties from those listed in this chapter. For 
example, largely on the design of Bitcoin with a few exceptions, Litecoin mines new blocks 
at a rate of 2.5 minutes rather than Bitcoin’s 10 minute interval between mining blocks.146 
Another example is Ripple, a cryptocurrency that is open source, yet proposes a centralized 
governance through a parent company and corporate investors.147 Despite different 
variations in how each altcoin functions, most coins enjoy many of same benefits of 
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Bitcoin. Consequently, according to Narayanan et al., the cryptocurrencies compete on the 
free marketplace of cryptocurrency exchanges for dominance as the most valuable 
currency, and users choose the coin that they deem having the most valuable features.148  
E. CONCLUSION 
This chapter’s intent has been to provide a brief synopsis of how cryptocurrencies 
like Bitcoin operate and to link cryptocurrency functionality to the potential for 
governmental regulation. The different dimensions of the processes this thesis discusses 
build upon in later chapters to offer talking points for future regulations and restrictions to 
limit or adopt cryptocurrencies. Bitcoin has proven itself as an innovative and resilient form 
of currency promoting new challenges to the state’s sovereign ability to regulate currency 
within its boundaries. The following chapters reference concepts of the blockchain, 
pseudonymous digital identities and wallets, cryptocurrency exchanges, the cryptocurrency 
ecosystem, and the altcoin.  
The author chose this chapter’s information under the pretense of linking 
cryptocurrency functionality to the potential for government enforcement of regulations or 
restrictions; therefore, the thesis references these concepts later. This chapter—by no 
means—completely covers the mathematics, technology, history, functionality, and 
applications of cryptocurrencies.149  
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III. BANNING CRYPTOCURRENCIES 
Chapter II explained the relevant basics of cryptocurrency and the aspects of the 
cryptocurrency ecosystem, which apply to this thesis. This chapter builds upon the 
information in the previous chapters, focusing on the interaction between cryptocurrency 
and the sovereign state to expound upon historical examples of states prohibiting virtual 
currencies and the reasons why and the methods how they have.  
As stated in the introduction of this thesis, cryptocurrencies challenge the 
sovereignty of states due to the growing popularity of cryptocurrencies as an alternative—
and unregulated—form of currency with which to transact. Consequently, this thesis 
assumes that states will attempt to gain control on cryptocurrency by passing legislation 
targeting cryptocurrency users, designers, or the cryptocurrencies themselves. However, 
this chapter specifically focuses on reasoning and methods of states that have partially or 
completely prohibited cryptocurrencies. 
This chapter on banning cryptocurrency is divided into five sections, starting with 
the first section detailing the reasons why a country might opt for a partial or total ban of 
cryptocurrencies. The second section lists the different aspects of cryptocurrency a state 
could choose to regulate to limit domestic cryptocurrency use. The third section provides 
a limited list and background of the sovereign states with an official stance either partially 
or completely against cryptocurrency. The fourth section discusses the effectiveness state-
backed regulation has had on prohibiting cryptocurrency transactions. The final section 
consists of the conclusion and key findings.  
A. WHY STATES CHOOSE TO BAN VIRTUAL CURRENCIES 
After surveying the literature available, this chapter identifies five common reasons 
why states might choose to ban cryptocurrencies. Although there are certainly other reasons 
that would drive a state toward the prohibition of virtual currencies, this chapter narrows 
its discussion to the five factors most frequently mentioned in this thesis’s research. The 
five provocations that might lead a state to ban cryptocurrency are  
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 bitcoin’s continued use as a method of payment within criminal networks  
 the weakening of the state’s ability to control the capital flow wealth, 
domestically and internationally, in decentralized cryptocurrency 
transactions 
 to restrict citizens ability to rally against the state and reduce the civil 
rights of the people  
 to eliminate competing virtual currencies in preparation for the release of a 
state-backed cryptocurrency  
 to eliminate the major fiscal and infrastructure drains cause by miners on 
the state controlled energy grid  
1. Bitcoin and Crime 
One potential reason why a state might suppress cryptocurrencies is to reduce 
domestic crime, or at least make the payment for crimes less rewarding. One of the major 
reasons why Bitcoin gained popularity—and the eye of the U.S. government—has been 
the cryptocurrency’s preference as a preferred currency in the Darknet.150 For example, 
the Silk Road, which is considered by many scholars to have been the most infamous 
Darknet marketplace, exclusively accepted bitcoins for illicit drugs and services. In fact, 
the Silk Road operated unopposed for over two years—despite governmental knowledge 
of the website—until the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) finally pinpointed and 
arrested the dark website’s founder in October of 2013.151 Moreover, by Lawrence 
Trautman’s account, Bitcoin transactions have been tied to a number of illicit cases of the 
Darknet, including paid assassinations, attacks on businesses, child exploitation and 
pornography, corporate espionage, drugs, fake IDs and passports, investment schemes, 
sexual exploitations, and stolen credit cards.152  
There are a number of reasons why illicit actors would choose cryptocurrencies to 
transact with over traditional fiat. In Trautman’s research, he reveals the five reasons why 
the U.S. Secret Service views virtual currencies as a threat, stating they offer criminals: 
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1. The greatest degree of anonymity for both users and transactions. 
2. The ability to quickly and confidently move illicit proceeds from one 
country to another. 
3. Low volatility, which results in lower exchange risk, increasing the digital 
currency’s ability to be an efficient means to transmit and store wealth. 
4. Widespread adoption in the criminal underground. 
5. Trustworthiness.153 
The correlation between Bitcoin and illicit activity has not gone unnoticed by the 
international community, and, as discussed later in the chapter, several governments blame 
the connection between Bitcoin and criminal enterprises as a motive for prohibiting virtual 
currencies.  
2. Increase the State’s Capital Controls 
One of the most attractive features that cryptocurrencies possess is the ability to 
transact seamlessly across sovereign state borders, intrinsically bypassing the regulations, 
taxes, tariffs, or sanctions to which traditional fiat currency is subject. By circumventing 
the fees associated with fiat, international cryptocurrency transactions are cheaper for both 
payees and recipients. Even though cryptocurrencies may provide substantial economic 
incentives for both merchants and customers, cryptocurrencies also possess significant 
negative drawbacks for the state. As Narayanan et al. point out, cryptocurrencies can defeat 
capital controls, which are defined as the “rules or laws that a country has in place that are 
designed to limit the flow of capital (money and other sets) into or out of the country.”154 
Capital controls are important and effective tools states, especially states in economic 
crisis, can use to stabilize the economy.  
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Thus, a potential solution of a state fearing capital flight155—due to political or 
economic instabilities—could be to ban cryptocurrencies or cryptocurrency exchanges. 
Narayanan et al. surmise, “a government that wants to enforce capital controls in a world 
with Bitcoin has to try and disconnect the Bitcoin world from the local fiat currency 
banking system.”156 Similarly, the IMF writes that “instead of purchasing foreign currency 
subject to government-imposed limitations, market participants can purchase VCs on the 
Internet and use them to conduct Internet-based foreign exchange transactions or make 
capital transfers that would otherwise be prohibited.”157 By banning cryptocurrencies or 
enacting legislation that would increase the difficultly of exchanging of fiat to 
cryptocurrency, sovereign states complicate the process by which wealth is exported 
outside of a nation. For example, China and Iceland both cite concerns about their right to 
control capital as a reason for their crackdown on cryptocurrencies, and this chapter 
discusses both countries in more detail later.158  
3. To Limit Civil Rights 
Another potential motive for the state to impede the use of cryptocurrencies—
exclusive to the more authoritarian systems of state control—would be to constrain or limit 
social movements or the peoples’ civil rights. The same benefits of anonymity, 
trustworthiness, and expediency that cryptocurrencies offer criminal networks could also 
benefit the civil rights movements within restrictive states. The unique features of 
cryptocurrencies could facilitate transactions for social movement leaders hiding from the 
heavy hand of the state. For example, Matthew Ponsford writes that the Chinese restriction 
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on Bitcoin is a byproduct of the restriction on the freedom of speech in China, remarking 
“bloggers, outspoken activists, or ‘revolutionaries’” could use technology like Bitcoin as 
methods of payment to skirt around the restrictive state controls on free speech.159  
4. To Introduce a State-backed Cryptocurrency 
One of the more interesting phenomenon research for this thesis discovered is the 
correlation between states choosing to prohibit aspects of decentralized virtual currencies 
that also plan to release their own respective state-controlled virtual currency. For example, 
in 2014, Ecuador enacted legislation that outlawed all cryptocurrencies, and then 
introduced its own electronic virtual currency.160 Lawrence White of the Cato Institute 
points out that the legislation “gave the state a monopoly in electronic money ... [and] 
barred the private mobile phone companies and private financial institutions from 
providing competing systems.”161  
Nonetheless, Ecuador’s experiment with electronic currency was short lived, 
lasting only four years and costing billions of dollars to upkeep.162 White’s analysis of the 
Ecuadorian project points to a combination of factors that led to a lack of popularity and 
ultimately the electronic currency’s downfall and he cites a lack of trust in the central bank, 
a less than convenient exchange system, and a reluctance from the citizens to disregard the 
heavily used and trusted U.S. dollar.163  
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Nevertheless, a sovereign state could attempt to introduce its own respective 
cryptocurrency and revise its approach to banning and adopting cryptocurrency from the 
lessons learned in Ecuador. For example, government officials in China announced in late 
March 2018 that the central bank intends to “launch a crackdown” on all virtual currencies, 
while simultaneously pushing “forward the research and development of its own digital 
currency.”164 
5. To Eliminate the Excessive Energy Consumption in Mining 
As emphasized in Chapter II, mining Bitcoins can be extremely profitable but, as a 
requirement, the process requires a tremendous amount of energy. Depending on the price 
of electricity, the cost of power is often the largest expense in mining; therefore, miners 
will seek the greatest return on investment in countries where electricity is cheap, or the 
state subsidizes electricity to the people.165 In such circumstances, mining becomes a 
physical and economic strain on the electrical grid, and a government could potentially 
outlaw or limit the mining of cryptocurrencies.  
A recent example of this occurred in early 2018 when China began to reduce the 
available power output to miners as a part of a greater long-term cryptocurrency 
crackdown.166 Similarly, Venezuela has taken actions against Bitcoin miners, despite an 
official government stance permitting cryptocurrency trading and ownership within the 
state. In 2017, Venezuela arrested Bitcoin miners, alleging they used 300 mining units to 
commit cyber fraud and power theft.167 
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B. MECHANISMS TO BAN VIRTUAL CURRENCIES 
Regardless of the reason for banning cryptocurrencies, the end goal of a partial or 
complete ban on cryptocurrencies is to discourage the use of cryptocurrency as a medium 
of transactions within a sovereign state. From the literature this thesis research, there are 
two separate avenues a government must approach to achieve the intended results of 
prohibiting virtual currencies. The state’s regulatory body must choose which aspects, if 
not all of them, to restrict, and then the state must determine how much punishment is 
required to enforce the policies.  
According to a November 2015 digital currency report for the Bank for 
International Settlements (BIS), there are five restrictive areas a state could target to 
prohibit or discourage cryptocurrency: retail transactions, acceptance by retailers, use as 
financial instruments, currency exchanges, or transactions between banks.168 The report 
also comments, “Authorities could seek to ban the use of digital currencies in their 
respective jurisdictions. Practically, this could imply a ban on any digital currency-based 
financial activities, as well as digital currency exchanges or digital currency acceptance by 
retailers.”169  
Even if a sovereign state chooses to restrict a specific area of cryptocurrency, the 
state must also demonstrate the means to enforce the policies if it is to be successful in 
disrupting domestic cryptocurrency use. Joshua Hendrickson and William Luther released 
a study titled “Banning Bitcoin,” in which they analyze the size of the state needed and the 
punishments require, to stop alternative currencies from functioning within a state.170 
Hendrickson and Luther find that  
A government can prevent an alternative [currency] from circulating if it is 
willing and able to mete out sufficiently sever punishments. ... 
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Sovereignty—that is, the ability of some agents to govern the behaviors of 
others—is a function of both size and power.171  
Furthermore, Hendrickson and Luther conclude from their research that a 
government of a sufficient size can prevent cryptocurrencies from circulating as a form of 
money without the need for punishments and completely ban a virtual currency if it can 
effectively punish individuals challenging the ban.172 Both the BIS report and “Banning 
Bitcoin” provide the hypothetical necessities required to prohibit cryptocurrencies. The 
next section of this chapter examines the countries that have implemented restrictions on 
cryptocurrencies.  
C. COUNTRIES THAT HAVE BANNED CRYPTOCURRENCIES. 
Decentralized cryptocurrencies pose a new and dynamic challenge to sovereign 
states; thus, by nature of the cryptocurrencies novelty, the international community remains 
divided on what action should be taken to confront cryptocurrencies. To cover the various 
methods states can respond to lawlessness of decentralized cryptocurrencies, this chapter 
provides short case studies on sovereign states that have enacted laws partially or 
completely prohibiting the domestic use of virtual currencies.  
The case studies in this section are divided into three groups: the sovereign states 
that have blanket legislation to prohibit cryptocurrencies, the systematic prohibition of 
cryptocurrencies in China, and the case of Iceland wherein separate aspects of 
cryptocurrencies are both banned and encouraged. Of the three case studies in this section, 
the discussion on China’s regulations provides the most detail and sections later in this 
chapter draw on it when discussing the effectiveness of banning cryptocurrencies. 
This chapter focuses on China as the prime case study example for three reasons. 
First, China has approached the prohibition of cryptocurrency methodically, gradually 
instituting new laws since 2013. Second, China appears to have had success in disrupting 
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its domestic cryptocurrency networks. Finally, China’s actions have had a notable 
corresponding effect on the international cryptocurrency marketplace.  
1. Countries That Have Banned Bitcoin: Bangladesh, Bolivia, Ecuador, 
Kyrgyzstan, and Nigeria 
As of March of 2018, five countries have adopted legislation that makes owning or 
transacting with cryptocurrencies illegal. For example, in 2017, the country of Bangladesh 
has outlawed Bitcoin and other virtual currencies. According to Bangladeshi law, 
transactions using Bitcoin or other virtual currencies are illegal, and violators are subject 
to a sentence of up to 12 years in prison.173 Kyrgyzstan also released similar guidance in 
2014, when the Kyrgyz government barred its citizens from using virtual currencies.174 
As discussed in the previous section, in Ecuador the “issuance, promotion or 
circulation of virtual currencies” is illegal.175 Likewise, as per the Central Bank of 
Bolivia’s directory resolution n044/2014, all “currency or coins not issued or regulated by 
the government, including a list of virtual currencies” are prohibited.176 The Bolivian 
government has also proven itself keen to enforce the policy, arresting 60 of its citizens in 
May for using bitcoins and altcoins as investments.177 Nigeria offers a more recent 
example of a state initiating an official stance on cryptocurrencies. As of early 2017, the 
Central Bank of Nigeria banned virtual currencies, stating “transactions in VCs are largely 
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untraceable and anonymous making them susceptible to abuse by criminals, especially in 
money laundering and financing of terrorism.”178  
2. China 
Of all of the nations that have attempted to ban cryptocurrency, the People’s 
Republic of China (PRC) has taken the most substantial actions to limit domestic 
cryptocurrency use in what could be described as the systematic installment of laws to 
discourage cryptocurrency use inside of Chinese borders. Starting in 2013, the People’s 
Bank of China (PBOC)—the state controlled central bank of China—enacted the country’s 
first step toward prohibiting cryptocurrency use when the state barred Chinese based 
financial institutions from using bitcoin as a method of transaction.179 By December 4, 
2013, the PBOC had advised commercial banks to prohibit “settlement or payments related 
to bitcoin. It also barred trust companies and fund-management firms from making bitcoin-
related investments and advised insurers not to insure bitcoins.”180  
Matthew Ponsford points out that in addition to the new Chinese restrictions on 
Bitcoin in 2013, China also instituted new requirements to the financial sector, requiring 
all Chinese-based cryptocurrency exchanges and trading platforms to “register with the 
Ministry of Industry and Information Technology ... [and] Telecommunication Bureau.”181 
Shortly after the 2013 restrictions, China further clamped down on domestic 
cryptocurrencies use when it ordered that all bitcoin trading accounts to shut down by April 
15, 2014.182  
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More recently, China has directed its laws toward the restriction of mechanisms in 
cryptocurrency allowing individuals to create or mine new currencies. In late 2017, Chinese 
regulators moved to ban Chinese public and corporate fundraising through initial coin 
offerings (ICO), a method commonly used to raise capital for new cryptocurrencies prior to 
release.183 China has since doubled-down on its anti-ICO policy. Starting in February of 
2018, the state officially discouraged Chinese companies abroad from issuing ICOs and 
started to block domestic Chinese Internet access to cryptocurrency development or trading 
websites.184 These actions build upon a January 2018 act that limited electricity to 
cryptocurrency miners and ordered “local governments to make an ‘orderly exit’ from the 
[cryptocurrency] industry.”185  
Grant Clark and Lulu Chen list several reasons why China has started to preclude 
cryptocurrencies, including “cleansing risk from financial markets,” which they describe as 
“a [Chinese] government mantra for more than two years.”186 Also, they cite other possible 
reasons that China has taken such actions against cryptocurrencies, such as targeting the 
shadow banking sector, eliminating the source of unregulated domestic loans, and limiting 
methods of moving money internationally.187 
A more transparent reason why the Chinese government assesses cryptocurrency as 
a threat is because of its ability to export capital overseas. Chinese regulation on capital 
controls limit the maximum outflow of yuan at 50,000 USD per person, per year.188 Instead 
of storing wealth in Chinese banks where the currency inflation is greater than the interest 
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gained, Chinese investors and businessmen can use cryptocurrencies as a means to deport 
wealth to other nations where their investments will be worth more. Ever vigilant to prevent 
capital flight, China views Bitcoin and other cryptocurrencies as a threat to the Chinese 
economy because it offers a new unregulated capital export option for wealthy Chinese 
citizens looking to invest abroad.  
To date, even though it is illegal to transact with cryptocurrencies, the PRC still 
allows its citizens to own them; however, this may change in the future. In an effort to 
discourage the domestic attraction of cryptocurrencies, the Chinese government and central 
bank have attacked the aspects allowing cryptocurrencies to operate as money, including the 
cryptocurrency exchanges that offer Chinese citizens access to the monetary world outside 
of the communist state. In any event, the effect that China has had on the domestic and 
international cryptocurrency market, irrespective of the cause for the systematic prohibition 
of digital currency is significant (as this chapter discusses later in detail). 
3. A Partial Ban in Iceland 
In contrast to the other countries discussed in this chapter, Iceland has taken a 
different administrative approach to Bitcoin and other virtual currencies. Jack Tatar explains 
that the Icelandic government—fearful of capital flight following the 2008 economic crisis—
passed the 2013 Icelandic Foreign Exchange Act, which permits its citizens to legally own 
and mine cryptocurrencies yet prohibits “foreign exchange trading” with virtual 
currencies.189 Despite the harsh international cryptocurrency trading platform maintained by 
the government, Iceland remains one of the top locations for mining Bitcoin and other 
cryptocurrencies. 
As companies confront new regulations in their native countries, Iceland offers an 
attractive combination of cheap power generated by hydroelectric plants, a cold climate to 
deal with the heat generated during the mining process, and a friendly business environment 
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that promotes the offshoring of international business to the Icelandic mainland.190 Tatar 
asserts that although Iceland appears to remain firm in its cryptocurrency capital controls, 
Bitcoin may prove to be a valuable asset that could pay dividends if the government 
unshackled its policy on foreign cryptocurrency exchanges.191 
D. THE EFFECTS OF BANNING CRYPTOCURRENCY 
Gauging the effectiveness of individual state regulations on cryptocurrency is 
challenging because cryptocurrency ecosystems transcend state borders and provide a 
significant amount of anonymity to their users. Moreover, cryptocurrencies and 
cryptocurrency exchanges are commonly referred to as the “wild west,” an analogy 
comparing the figurative parallels of lawlessness and anarchy prevalent in the cryptocurrency 
ecosystem to that of the North American frontier.192 Comparatively, it is these same factors 
of lawlessness and anarchy confounding how states approach the cryptocurrency dilemma, 
which also complicates the measurement of state regulation’s effects in the cryptocurrency 
ecosystem, or the corresponding compliance of citizens with sovereign state’s virtual 
currency laws.  
From the research this thesis effort examines, there appears to be no definitive 
analysis on the effectiveness of governmental laws and regulations on Bitcoin’s users. The 
reactivity of markets, the value of bitcoin, fluctuations in user population, the number of daily 
transactions, and the locations of miners are all suggested methods to measure the pulse of 
cryptocurrency; however, the application of tools hiding users’ identities, like virtual private 
networks and the Darknet, can skew data. There are simply too many variables that go into 
the value of cryptocurrency to provide an in depth analysis in this thesis. Therefore, to steer 
the discussion toward the questions posed in this thesis, this section focuses on the authors 
who have made connections between the correlation on the price of bitcoin, response of 
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domestic cryptocurrency miners, and exchanges in countries that choose to ban 
cryptocurrency.  
1. China’s Impact on Cryptocurrencies 
Of all the countries that have enacted laws to restrict virtual currencies, none have 
had a greater effect on the cryptocurrency ecosystem than China. According to many 
cryptocurrency enthusiasts and bloggers closely following cryptocurrencies, there is a 
seemingly apparent connection between the legislation that China passes (or announces), and 
the price of cryptocurrencies worldwide; however, this thesis could find no scholarly source 
that verifies, proves, or discredits the claim that China holds significant power over 
cryptocurrencies. Therefore, this section focuses on the impact Chinese legislation has had 
on Bitcoin miners and exchanges and the correlation between bitcoin price and news of new 
Chinese regulations.  
China’s laws on mining appear to have had an impact on Chinese miners and mining 
companies within the PRC borders. Grant Clark and Lulu Chen point out that China has 
changed the entire mining industry after its January legislation limiting electricity to Chinese 
miners. They explicate, “miners initially flocked to China because of its inexpensive power, 
local chipmaking factories and cheap labor—now they may have to look elsewhere.”193 
Clark and Chen state 
the moves [new legislation] are reshaping the Bitcoin mining industry and 
driving up costs. Bitmain, which runs China’s two largest Bitcoin-mining 
collectives, is setting up regional headquarters in Singapore and now has 
mining operations in the U.S. and Canada. BTC.Top, the No. 3 mining pool, 
is also opening a facility in Canada. Bitcoin exchanges and wallet services in 
the country are also leaving, setting up over-the-counter shops in Hong Kong 
or looking at operating out of Singapore or South Korea.194 
In addition, China also appears to have influenced the value of bitcoin worldwide. 
Andrew Marshall writes that China has had an invariably important relationship with Bitcoin, 
and he argues that “no other country’s government has had such a consistent and powerful 
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effect on Bitcoin price.”195 He observes that China’s first impact on the cryptocurrency 
market occurred after the PBoC forbid Chinese financial institutions from using Bitcoin in 
late 2013, an occurrence that directly impacted the largest bitcoin exchange in the world, 
BTC China, and caused the price of Bitcoin to plummet to less than 50 percent over a period 
of two weeks.196 Marshal reports that a similar occurrence in January 2017 when the PBoC 
bank executed on-site inspections on Chinese exchanges “to look into capital flight, money 
laundering and market manipulation” that resulted in a 10 percent decline in value.197 
A similar occurrence appeared after China banned ICOs and shut down exchanges in 
September of 2017, appearing to cause a reactionary market decline of bitcoin’s value from 
5000 USD to 3000.198 The speculative market that drives the price of cryptocurrencies is 
volatile and is susceptible to rumors and regulations worldwide. Although the cryptocurrency 
market initially declined in the wake of the new Chinese regulation, the market quickly 
rebounded, skyrocketing back to 7000 USD in a few weeks’ time.199  
There may be correlation between Chinese regulations and the price of bitcoin; 
however, gauging the Chinese impact on the international cryptocurrency ecosystem is not a 
simple matter; an entire thesis could be dedicated to quantitatively analyzing the cause and 
effect relationship. The research presented by this this, however, did not encounter any 
scholarly sources analyzing the effect that China’s prohibitive laws have had on its people, 
or how successful the enforcement of those policies have been. What is certain is that 
decentralized virtual currencies will continue to function despite the Chinese governmental 
animosity toward cryptocurrencies. As Vigna and Casey assert,  
The Chinese government might bar its banks from handling bitcoin-related 
transaction services or declare that only the yuan be used within the nation’s 
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borders, but it can’t shut down bitcoin, which resides nowhere and 
everywhere. The same challenge faces any government.200  
In the future, China may choose to prohibit individual ownership of cryptocurrencies, but as 
of now, it seems intent on denying its citizens access to the cryptocurrency ecosystem.  
2. Other States’ Effect in Banning Cryptocurrencies 
Outside of China, sovereign states that have banned cryptocurrencies appear to have 
had mixed domestic result in their efforts to prevent their citizens from obtaining Bitcoin and 
other cryptocurrencies. Again, one such case is in Nigeria where cryptocurrencies like 
Bitcoin have been deemed illegal. Even so, the Nigerian government and central bank both 
acknowledge that they are nearly powerless to enforce cryptocurrency laws, admitting in a 
governmental conference in 2018 that the “Central bank cannot control or regulate bitcoin. 
Central bank cannot control or regulate blockchain. Just the same way no one is going to 
control or regulate the Internet. We don’t own it.”201 In the case of Nigeria, the state can tell 
its citizens that cryptocurrencies are illegal, but given the combination of an economic 
opportunity investing in bitcoin and the lack of sufficient state power to find and punish 
violators, it is unlikely that the country will be able to eliminate cryptocurrency users under 
its sovereignty.  
A similar case to Nigeria can be found in Ecuador, where Bitcoin has been illegal for 
four years to date. Alexandra Veloz writes in mid-2017 “even if the law only allows the flow 
of electronic backed money backed by the Central Bank, people are using and buying bitcoin 
increasingly often.”202 Likewise in Venezuela, where the country has arrested Bitcoin 
miners in the past, the citizens continue to risk prosecution by mining and transacting bitcoins 
to survive in the hyperinflated economy.203 
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A more striking development is a surge in demand for bitcoin in countries that have 
clamped down on the legality of cryptocurrencies. For example, one local Nigerian exchange 
in late December 2017 valued of bitcoin 15 percent higher than exchanges outside of the 
country, in the face of then-new governmental warnings on cryptocurrency.204  
3. Banning Cryptocurrency Internationally  
A sovereign state that chooses to ban cryptocurrency may find the enforcement of 
anti-cryptocurrency policies difficult, especially when cryptocurrency is accepted 
internationally. There is not internationally recognized regulatory standard for the regulation 
and prosecution of cryptocurrencies. While countries like Bangladesh, China, Ecuador, and 
Nigeria may choose to outlaw cryptocurrencies, the vast majority of other nations have yet 
to adopt such a critical stance on cryptocurrencies, thereby fueling the cryptocurrency 
ecosystem to thrive internationally in the face of nations seeking prohibit its use. Matthew 
Ponsford, comments, “inconsistencies in regulation have posed many challenges for 
jurisdictions currently attempting to mitigate regulatory deficiencies,” highlighting the 
difficulties of international cooperation to obtain records and prosecute violators 
internationally.205 A sovereign state prohibiting cryptocurrencies may be surrounded 
geographically by countries accepting of them or be interdependent economically with 
sovereign entities embracing virtual currencies. As a consequence, individual admission to 
the cryptocurrency ecosystem only requires Internet access and a willingness to participate, 
regardless of the state laws to which citizens are subordinate.  
E. CONCLUSION 
Banning cryptocurrencies may be a tool for sovereign states that want to contain or 
restrict its citizens from using cryptocurrency, but there is still no clear defined verdict on 
how effective the measures are internal to the state. Of the countries identified in this chapter, 
the gradual implementation of anti-cryptocurrency laws in China appears to have the greatest 
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affect international market for cryptocurrencies, but only because the Chinese labor and 
power costs have been conducive to a growing cryptocurrency ecosystem.  
A sovereign state may attempt to ban aspects of cryptocurrencies to regain its controls 
on the monetary supply, but there will always be individuals and organizations that will find 
illegal methods to move money away from the prying eye of the state. If anything, the 
research has shown that a sovereign state wherein cryptocurrencies are considered illegal 
may not have the capacity to prevent or prosecute individuals within its jurisdiction. This 
conclusion is justified by the thriving cryptocurrency ecosystem in sovereign states where 
cryptocurrencies are considered illegal and highlights to the inability of the state to enforce 
laws against domestic cryptocurrency users.206 If a sovereign state was to become truly 
successful at regulating or prohibiting cryptocurrency, the state would need to completely 
control or deny its citizens access to the Internet. 
Another conclusion is that it may not feasible for solitary, less developed nation to 
ban cryptocurrencies while other nations regulate or adopt them. Weaker, less developed 
states may find themselves unable to enforce their anti-cryptocurrency policies and lacking 
the technology or capability to find and prosecute individuals or organizations violating their 
anti-virtual currency laws. Likewise, BIS offers the suggestion that any unitary attempt by 
individual states to ban cryptocurrencies may be less than effective, observing that “given 
the nature of digital currencies, which are typically online and therefore not limited to 
national jurisdictions, a coordinated approach at a global level may be important for 
regulation to be fully effective.”207 However, banning cryptocurrency is just one answer to 
how sovereign states can deal with the challenges posed by decentralized virtual currencies. 
In the next chapter, this thesis illuminates how states can regulate the cryptocurrency 
ecosystem to minimize its impact to the sovereign functions of the state.  
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IV. THE REGULATION OF CRYPTOCURRENCY 
Chapter III explored the methods of sovereign states in banning cryptocurrencies. 
This chapter approaches the regulation of cryptocurrency in a similar approach to Chapter 
III; however, state-backed regulation of cryptocurrency differs in rationale and 
implementation from the states that choose to ban virtual currencies. For purposes of this 
chapter, cryptocurrency regulations are the potential methods by which a state allows its 
citizens to legally obtain, transact, and develop cryptocurrencies without the state actually 
recognizing, adopting, or banning aspects of virtual currencies. At the time of writing, no 
clear virtual currency regulation exists on a supranational level. Even states with strong 
economic and political ties have shown little similarity in the methods by which they 
choose to target the emerging cryptocurrency ecosystem.  
As discussed in Chapter II, cryptocurrency’s peer-to-peer nature transcends 
physical state borders, transacting across a range of sovereign entities, each with its own 
take on the how to regulate cryptocurrencies. Because the question of cryptocurrency and 
state sovereignty surpasses individual states, there are a number of regulatory responses 
drawn on an international, multistate level. To explore state-backed regulation in 
cryptocurrency, this chapter is divided into five sections. First, this chapter presents the 
rationale as to why a state would choose to regulate cryptocurrencies over banning or over 
adopting its own state-backed cryptocurrency. The second section explains the difficulties 
of regulating cryptocurrency within a sovereign state. The third section outlines a range of 
broad methods that sovereign states could use to approach the question of regulation and 
cryptocurrency. The fourth section presents the regulatory action taken by the United States 
as a case study because of the sophisticated and intricate regulatory response taken. The 
fourth section also discusses the regulatory action taken on a supranational level by the 
European Union (EU), and the guidance provided from the international institutions of the 
IMF and BIS. The fifth and final section of this chapter offers concluding thoughts on 
sovereign states’ regulation of cryptocurrency.   
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A. THE RATIONAL TO REGULATE VIRTUAL CURRENCIES 
The rationale to regulate cryptocurrencies is not unlike the reasons listed for 
banning cryptocurrency presented in Chapter III. However, by allowing cryptocurrencies 
to function legally within the sovereignty of the state, the governing body also assumes the 
risks associate with cryptocurrency, which may challenge the state’s economic, political, 
and law enforcement capabilities.208 This section discusses the three reasons why a state 
would choose to regulate cryptocurrencies: consumer protection, the prevention of money 
laundering, and fiscal policy protection. 
1. Consumer Protection 
Sovereign states often quote consumer protection as a fundamental reason to 
regulate cryptocurrencies due to the risks inherent in the unregulated cryptocurrency 
market. As the BIS states, “central banks typically have a responsibility to promote safe 
and efficient payment systems.”209 For instance, investors could face the potential for loss 
due to the volatility of value in cryptocurrency markets. The BIS also points out that due 
to the relative anonymity in cryptocurrency transactions, there is a large risk of fraud in 
digital currency markets.    
2. Money Laundering 
The pseudoanonymity inherent in cryptocurrency has generated a number of 
difficulties for law enforcement agencies. As stated by the 2015 BIS report, the “relative 
anonymity of digital currencies may make them especially susceptible to money laundering 
and other criminal activities.”210 Cryptocurrencies can easily be transferred from fiat to 
cryptocurrency, transferred through a number of virtual wallets, and then exchanged back 
into fiat currency via an exchange or via a transfer of cryptocurrency to another user’s 
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virtual wallet in exchange for cash. While trackable through the blockchain, this process 
complicates the legal requirements that permit law enforcement to track and prosecute 
money launderers. A sovereign state could attempt to regulate cryptocurrency exchanges 
or require its citizens to register cryptocurrency accounts to increase the visibility of 
transactions.  
3. To Protect Monetary Policy 
In the theoretical event that that a non-sovereign cryptocurrency becomes widely 
accepted and used without adequate state-controlled regulations in place, the citizens could 
bypass the sovereign state and central bank completely. If such an event was to occur, the 
result could be a weakening of the sovereign government and central bank to issue and 
control interest rates and the weakening of monetary policy. The CPMI report explains, “a 
widespread substitution of banknotes with digital currencies could lead to a decline in 
central bank non-interest paying liabilities. . . . The result could be a reduction in central 
bank earnings that constitute central bank seigniorage revenue.”211 Likewise, if 
cryptocurrency becomes widespread, citizens would no longer require the use of banks in 
favor of the peer-to-peer nature of the blockchain. The result would be a change in the 
central bank’s monetary policy.  
B. DIFFICULTIES OF REGULATING CRYPTOCURRENCIES 
States face an inherent challenge in regulating cryptocurrencies—finding an 
appropriate level of regulation that minimally infringes on the citizens’ rights to own or 
use cryptocurrency but also retaining a level of control over cryptocurrencies meeting 
sovereign state needs. The needs of individual states vary and are dependent upon the 
political, economic, and law enforcement requirements. Because cryptocurrencies 
themselves do not pose an inherent threat to the state or its citizens, some law scholars 
argue that it is beyond the control of the state to prohibit ownership or transactions with 
virtual currencies. For example, Bryans writes: 
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In an increasingly digital world, it makes perfect economic and societal 
sense to allow digital currencies, government-backed or otherwise. . . . 
Regulation of such currencies should occur at the point where law 
enforcement can most effectively punish civil and criminal violations with 
the least overhead.212 
More importantly, cryptocurrencies are difficult to define, and therefore, they are 
difficult to regulate. The IMF asserts that cryptocurrencies “combine properties of 
currencies, commodities, and payment systems, and their classification as one or the other 
will often have implications for their legal and regulatory treatment.”213 Additionally, 
Bohme et al. affirm, “it is infeasible to regulate all peers in the Bitcoin network due to their 
quantity, their geographic distribution, and the privacy protections in the network. Instead, 
regulators are naturally drawn to key intermediaries.”214 The lack of an established 
definition or regulation to group cryptocurrencies under, coupled with the transnational 
reach of virtual currencies and the difficulty of monitoring transactions, has shaped a 
multitude of sovereign responses internationally, diverse in methods that are used to 
restrain cryptocurrencies. As a consequence, the regulatory approaches level of 
intrusiveness vary by regulation on cryptocurrencies on a case-by-case basis and are 
explored later in the chapter. 
C. METHODS OF REGULATING CRYPTOCURRENCY 
The 2015 CPMI report for the BIS also lists four broad classifications detailing how 
a sovereign state can regulate—without banning—virtual currencies. This section is 
divided upon the four broad classifications listed and complements the information 
provided by the BIS with other scholarly sources to provide an analysis of the regulatory 
actions available to sovereign states. The four broad categories of regulation are: 
informational/moral suasion, the regulation of specific entities, interpretation of existing 
regulations, and the creation broader regulations to target cryptocurrencies.  
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1. Informational and Moral Suasion 
The moral suasion regulatory option presented by the BIS proposes highlighting 
the risks and dangers of investing, transacting with, and mining cryptocurrency to the 
general public, indirectly weakening the appeal of cryptocurrencies to the public.215 
Examples of the informational approach include public warnings, promoting general 
information on investing and buying cryptocurrencies, and providing research papers to 
the public.216 
As outlined in Chapter II, Bitcoin and other currencies obtain their value through a 
system of supply and demand, and by many individuals and businesses view them as an 
investment rather than a currency. As a result, the value of cryptocurrency is reactionary 
to potential news that might affect its wealth. A sovereign state could use cryptocurrency’s 
reactionary value to pass new cryptocurrency restrictions, or simply suggest implementing 
new cryptocurrency regulations, to indirectly discourage citizens’ use of cryptocurrencies 
by reducing its investment potential.  
2. The Regulation of Specific Stakeholders 
A governing body could also create regulations on specific stakeholders, such as 
targeting the privately owned financial institutions functioning as key parts of a 
cryptocurrency network.217 For example, a cryptocurrency exchange is considered a 
financial based institution, and an example of a regulation in this category would be the 
creation of minimum consumer protection requirements to which the exchange or other 
institution would be subject. Another example would be the requirement of locally owned 
exchanges to keep and provide records to regulatory bodies when necessary.  
3. Interpretation of Existing Regulations 
Another method by which a government could regulate cryptocurrencies would be 
to interpret the existing laws of the state so that cryptocurrencies would fall under the 
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existing legislative framework.218 For instance, in the United States, federal entities have 
taken advantage of the lack of a clear definition of what a virtual currency is (e.g., security, 
currency, property), allowing a range of cooperating government organizations to enforce 
standards upon cryptocurrency users under the prior-existing laws.  
4. The Creation of Broader Regulation 
Sovereign governments may enact new, broader legislation that combines or covers 
the larger aspects of cryptocurrency listed like consumer protection, organizational rules 
for stakeholders, and specific operating rules.219 For instance, the CPMI suggests that state 
authorities could create broad AML and counter-terrorist financing (CTF) regulations that 
would cover all cryptocurrency transactions, as well as payment methods, and 
cryptocurrency exchanges under a single regulatory law.220 
D. SELECTIVE SUMMARY OF CURRENT CRYPTOCURRENCY 
REGULATION 
This section focuses almost exclusively on the regulation that the United States has 
enacted on cryptocurrency to serve as an example of a state that has regulated 
cryptocurrency. This thesis focuses on the United States because arguably the United States 
has some of the most complex and complicated virtual currency regulation, with regulatory 
bodies releasing new regulations and virtual currency guidance nearly every month. This 
section also briefly discusses the regulatory actions and lack of action taken by the EU and 
on an international level.  
1. The United States 
The United States arguably has one of the most complicated and robust standards 
on virtual currencies. Because cryptocurrencies are neither easily defined, nor easily 
categorized under existing laws, multiple regulatory bodies within the United States have 
released their own guidance for the conduct of cryptocurrency transactions, investments, 
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and ownership for U.S. citizens. As stated by a 2018 Commodity Futures Trading 
Commission (CFTC) report, “US law does not provide for direct, comprehensive federal 
oversight of underlying Bitcoin or virtual currency spot markets. As a result, U.S. 
regulation of virtual currencies has evolved into a multifaceted, multi-regulatory 
approach.”221 Under U.S. law, virtual currencies are considered to be as either property, 
commodity, or security, dependent upon which U.S. regulatory body is charged with the 
regulation.  
a. Law Enforcement Agencies 
The FBI is responsible for shutting down the Silk Road, an illicit Dark Web 
marketplace that used bitcoin as the only accepted method of payment.222 After two years 
of searching, on October 1, 2013, the FBI was finally able to pinpoint and arrest the founder 
and operator of the Silk Road, Ross Ulbricht, on the charges of “narcotics trafficking and 
money laundering conspiracies through creating and operating Silk Road. The FBI seized 
all the bitcoins stored on the website,” allowing federal marshals to later sell 29,655 
bitcoins at auction.223 The arrest of Ulbricht and downfall of the Silk Road was the first 
large-scale criminal investigation of criminal acts involving cryptocurrencies. As a result, 
the 2013 case of the Silk Road has become widely associated with illicit cryptocurrency 
use and has focused the attention of lawmakers and scholars towards studying the legality 
of bitcoin.   
b. Internal Revenue Service  
In March 2014, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) released tax guidance for virtual 
currencies like Bitcoin and defined virtual currency as property under U.S. federal law.224 
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Under the IRS guidance, individuals who transact, pay, or trade cryptocurrency are 
responsible for reporting capital gains made during transactions or trades with 
cryptocurrencies. Likewise, payments for services with virtual currencies are liable to the 
same U.S. tax law as payments made with property.  
c. Commodity Futures Trading Commission 
The CFTC is an independent regulatory organization of the United States 
responsible for monitoring and regulating the wide assortment commodity markets “to 
foster open, transparent, competitive, and financially sound markets.”225 The CFTC 
“declared virtual currencies to be a ‘commodity’226 subject to oversight under its authority 
under the Commodity Exchange Act (CEA)” in 2014.227 Since then, the CFTC has held a 
significant role in shaping public awareness and the current U.S. regulations in the 
cryptocurrency ecosystem. 
The CFTC divides its approach on the regulation of virtual currencies into five 
categories: consumer education to provide greater public information on virtual currencies; 
asserting legal authority to provide anti-fraud and manipulation regulations on virtual 
currency derivatives; obtaining market intelligence to gather information and data on 
virtual currency derivative; robust enforcement “to enforce the law and prosecute fraud, 
abuse, manipulation or false solicitation in markets for virtual currency derivatives and 
underlying spot trading;” and government-wide coordination of virtual currencies with 
other federal regulators.228  
Under the authority bestowed by the CEA, the CFTC has taken a number of 
enforcement actions on cryptocurrencies, including acting against unregulated exchanges 
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domestically and abroad, enforcing laws prohibiting illegal trading on derivative platforms, 
and issuing guidance on regulatory matters involving virtual currencies.229 The CFTC has 
also created a virtual currency self-certification process to enforce the regulations put forth 
by the CFTC, while allowing U.S. exchanges access to Bitcoin future contracts.230 The 
self-certification process has since allowed two large market exchanges—the Chicago 
Mercantile Exchange Inc. and the Chicago Board of Options Exchange—to offer bitcoin 
future contracts as of December 1, 2017.231 
d. Security and Exchange Commission  
One of the more recent U.S. agencies to offer guidance on cryptocurrency is the 
Security and Exchange Commission (SEC), whose mission statement “is to protect 
investors, maintain fair, orderly, and efficient markets, and facilitate capital formation” in 
the buying and selling of stocks.232 In a move to promote investor awareness and 
protection in the cryptocurrency market, the SEC has recently released public guidance on 
the conduct of cryptocurrency initial coin offerings (ICO). Similar to the concept of IPOs, 
developers use ICOs to raise capital in the form of U.S. dollars or other cryptocurrency in 
return for the pre-public release of the developer’s token or cryptocurrency at an 
established price.233 The company promoting the ICO benefits by raising capital prior to 
the official release, and the customers can often buy the proposed cryptocurrency at a value 
less than expected, offering the potential of a quick profit to investors.   
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Although the SEC has released strenuous guidance for ICOs, the organization has 
yet to clarify if cryptocurrencies are considered securities, which leaves ambiguity for 
future possible SEC intervention into the cryptocurrency market.234 For example, after 
weighing the pros and cons of cryptocurrency use in the official 2017 public statement on 
cryptocurrencies and ICOs, SEC Chair Jay Clayton writes:  
It has been asserted that cryptocurrencies are not securities and that the offer 
and sale of cryptocurrencies are beyond the SEC’s jurisdiction. Whether 
that assertion proves correct with respect to any digital asset that is labeled 
as a cryptocurrency will depend on the characteristics and use of that 
particular asset.235 
Since the 2017 public release, the SEC has provided further guidance outlining 
investor considerations for cryptocurrency trading. The most recent (March 7, 2018) public 
release by the SEC, a report, has since turned to cryptocurrency exchanges, highlighting 
that there are a number of cryptocurrency exchanges that do not adhere to the SEC 
standards. Thus, the unregistered exchanges do not receive the SEC established investor 
protections.236 Moreover, the SEC declares, “a number of these platforms provide a 
mechanism for trading assets that meet the definition of a ‘security’ under the federal 
securities laws.”237 Finally, this report announces that cryptocurrency exchanges may be 
required—depending on the circumstances—to register with the SEC and adhere to 
federally established minimums set by the SEC for securities and exchanges.  
e. Office of Foreign Assets Control 
The U.S. Treasury’s Office has also released new requirements through the Office 
of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC), mandating U.S. cryptocurrency exchanges and 
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investors to blacklist specific cryptocurrency addresses that the OFAC deems as a threat to 
the United States.238 The list, referred to by OFAC as the specially designated nationals, 
targets individuals, groups, and companies that do not necessarily need to be a part of a 
sovereign state.  
f. Financial Crimes Enforcement Network 
The Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) operates as the U.S. 
Treasury’s law enforcement arm, and it is responsible for directing regulation and 
enforcement of virtual currencies. According to the FinCEN official website, “FinCEN’s 
mission is to safeguard the financial system from illicit use and combat money laundering 
and promote national security through the collection, analysis, and dissemination of 
financial intelligence and strategic use of financial authorities.”239 FinCEN considers 
virtual currency to be “a medium of exchange that operates like a currency in some 
environments, but does not have all the attributes of a real currency. In particular, virtual 
currency does not have legal tender status in any jurisdiction.”240 However, FinCEN’s 
interest in virtual currencies stems from users’ ability to exchange U.S. fiat dollars for 
cryptocurrency and vice versa readily and quickly.  
Virtual currencies are subject to the laws contained in the Bank Secrecy Act (BSA), 
an act FinCEN explains as the “[United States] first and most comprehensive Federal anti-
money laundering and counter-terrorism financing statute.”241 The 2013 guidance, which 
officially applies the FinCEN regulations to virtual currencies, expands upon the laws 
contained in the BSA to delineate the key participants subject to FinCEN regulations. As 
such, the various participants of virtual currencies are arranged into three categories 
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FinCEN defines as users, administrators, and exchangers of virtual currency (defined in 
the footnotes).242 Moreover, the enforcement of FinCEN regulations only apply to virtual 
currency administrators and exchangers since they are considered money transmitters.243 
As of now, the FinCEN regulations are only applicable to the administrators and 
exchangers of virtual currencies because they are classified as money service businesses, 
and therefore, they are subject to the registration, reporting, and recordkeeping stipulated 
under the BSA. 
2. Regulation in the European Union 
As of the time of writing, virtual currencies are completely legal under the 
supranational guidance of the EU, allowing the EU member nations to regulate 
cryptocurrency as they see fit. Compared to the United States, the EU’s Central Bank 
(ECB) has taken a laissez-faire approach to virtual currencies, officially stating, “it is not 
in the ECB’s responsibility to ban or regulate bitcoin or other cryptocurrencies.”244 The 
ECB has instead elected to provide the public with an informational approach highlighting 
the risks of investing and using cryptocurrencies. Furthermore, the ECB also argues Bitcoin 
and other virtual currencies are not actually considered currency, citing the following four 
reasons as justification: first, Bitcoin lacks a central authority. Second, Bitcoin has a limited 
following of customers and merchants. Third, cryptocurrency transactions lack any legal 
protection by the EU. Finally, the volatility of cryptocurrency is too unstable to be 
predicted or used as a form of reliable payment. 
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Likewise, in November 2017, the EU has also released public guidance from the 
European Security and Markets Authority (ESMA) providing EU citizens with the risks 
associated with ICOs.245 The ESMA has since expanded the precautions to citizens of 
virtual currencies, releasing another round of public awareness to pan-EU consumers on 
the risks associated with buying and trading virtual currencies.246  
3. International Regulation 
The current focus by many of the international standard setting institutions like the 
IMF and the BIS appears to be a research and wait-and-see response. In this thesis, most 
of the cited potential issues that cryptocurrency poses to the sovereign state are drawn from 
the research reports released by the IMF and BIS. For example, writing for the IMF, Dong 
He et al. note, “the Financial Action Task Force (FATF)—the AML/CFT standard-setter—
and the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) have focused on the 
prevention and law enforcement response to the money laundering risks posed by VCs” on 
an international level.”247 Even if new standards were created, the reach of international 
regulators only extend as far as the countries that choose to adhere to the proposed 
standards. Outside the creation of law enforcement standards for money laundering and 
terror financing, there is little coordination against cryptocurrency on a multinational level.   
E. CONCLUSION 
Sovereign state regulatory agencies walk a tightrope between restricting and 
adopting cryptocurrency. He et al. explain, “[t]he challenge for policymakers has often 
turned on finding a balance between addressing the risks and vulnerabilities posed by VCs 
while not stifling innovation.”248 Moreover, one could make the case that restricting or 
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prohibiting cryptocurrency in liberal democracies, which are founded on the ideals of 
individual liberties, is an impracticality. Therefore, states will need to implement 
restrictions on virtual currencies through the interpretation of existing laws, like in the 
United States, or choose to create new, all-inclusive regulation mitigating the negative 
attributes of cryptocurrency use.  
Cryptocurrencies are an unprecedented step toward a new method of transaction 
used both legally and illegally; therefore, sovereign governments will inevitably need to 
pursue new regulations on virtual currencies to minimize illicit activities. Governing 
bodies, regardless of their policy toward virtual currencies, need to address money 
laundering, fiscal policy, and consumer protection. The route of regulation on 
cryptocurrency will depend on a number of social, political, and economic factors. Whether 
virtual currency regulations be a hands-on, multifaceted approach as seen in the United 
States, less obtrusive moral suasion approach by the EU, or a new creation of broader 
regulation, a state’s likely approach to cryptocurrency regulation is reflective of how much 
the state views cryptocurrency as a threat. This chapter has focused on the reasons why a 
sovereign state would seek to regulate cryptocurrency and outlined a number of possible 
regulatory actions available to the state. The next chapter expands upon the adoption of 
cryptocurrency by the sovereign state and explores how cryptocurrencies can officially 




V. THE ADOPTION OF CRYPTOCURRENCIES BY 
SOVEREIGN STATES 
Chapter IV explored the rationale, methods, and real-world cases of regulating 
cryptocurrency by sovereign states. This chapter directs its focus toward the adoption of 
cryptocurrency within sovereign states. There are two distinct categories of state-sponsored 
cryptocurrency. The first is the sovereign states that recognize prior-existing stateless 
cryptocurrencies (e.g., Bitcoin) as a form of legal tender, and second is the cryptocurrencies 
specifically developed by a sovereign state that supplants or supplements the existing 
sovereign currency. This chapter begins with a brief discussion of the benefits a sovereign 
cryptocurrency could provide to a state. The second section expands on the development 
and implementation of state-sponsored cryptocurrency by analyzing the sovereign states 
that plan to adopt or issue a state-backed cryptocurrency. The third section details a 
selection of political and social obstacles of incorporating a sovereign-state 
cryptocurrency.  
A. REASONS FOR STATES TO USE CRYPTOCURRENCY  
Whether a state adopts a preexisting stateless cryptocurrency or decides to create a 
new state-backed virtual currency, there are a number of reasons why a sovereign state 
might choose to incorporate a blockchain-based virtual currency into its financial system. 
This section highlights the potential benefits for sovereign states should they choose to 
adopt or create their own cryptocurrency with four examples: the inclusion of the unbanked 
costs, cheaper transaction costs, cryptocurrency’s ability to bypass sanctions, and 
cryptocurrency’s feature, which permits the state access to the full transaction history.  
1. To Incorporate the Unbanked  
A state cryptocurrency, adopted (Bitcoin) or created by a central bank, could be 
used by less-developed countries to include the citizens who are not connected with 
banking institutions, decreasing the poverty stricken individuals in a country while driving 
economic growth. These people remain isolated from bank access due to a number of 
reasons: lack of access to standing banking infrastructure, some countries have a weak 
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institutional identification process that creates risk for banks to invest in people, and then 
there are the lack of profits when investing in the poor vice richer people elsewhere in the 
world.249 Vigna and Casey write that there are “roughly 2.5 billion adults in the world . . . 
that are cut off from a financial system that the rest of us take for granted.”250 They 
describe the excluded people—those without access to banking services such as saving 
accounts, checking accounts, and credit cards—as the unbanked. The unbanked are unable 
to store and secure money in banks, make purchases on the Internet, or effectively transact 
outside of their local area, and therefore, are a huge untapped market for services and 
goods.  
On the other hand, cryptocurrencies only require the Internet to move money, and 
does not require identification for access. If a less-developed or developing state decided 
to adopt and accept cryptocurrency as a form of money, theoretically, the unbanked citizens 
would be granted access to every other cryptocurrency user. As Vigna and Casey highlight, 
“financially integrating a third of humanity could create vast new opportunities for world 
trade and for attacking poverty.”251 By including the lower socioeconomic classes that 
have been historically barred from participating in the global financial order, the state can 
simultaneously uplift the poorest parts of its population, connect those individuals with the 
state and global economy, and develop the resident human capital as greater economic 
participants within the state. Ultimately, by implementing a state sanctioned 
cryptocurrency system easily accessible to all individuals regardless of income, the people 
can benefit from what this thesis discusses next, cheaper transaction costs.    
2. Cheaper Transaction Costs  
Additionally, a state-adopted or developed cryptocurrency could substantially 
reduce the cost to move money transnationally over other money wire services Western 
Union. According to Vigna and Casey, when using traditional fiat currencies there can be 
up to seven paid intermediaries in a traditional credit card transaction between a customer 
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and a merchant, agents who are responsible for either recording the identities of the users 
or verifying that the appropriate funds are transferred from payee to merchant.252 A bank 
or credit card company charges merchants small fees for the intermediary service; however, 
as Vigna and Casey illuminate, transactions across sovereign currencies (e.g., from U.S. 
dollar to euros or pesos) incur additional exchange fees, adding up to roughly an eight 
percent fee per transaction.253 Moreover, if an individual chooses to send money directly 
through a service like western union, the fee could be as high as 11 percent.254 The end 
result is a process that makes credit card transactions trustworthy but timely and costly 
since the merchants often pass that third-party costs to the customer in a process that can 
take days to complete.    
In contrast, purchases with cryptocurrencies like Bitcoin remove the third parties 
from the transaction process. As discussed in Chapter II, cryptocurrencies replace 
expensive intermediaries with the blockchain, permitting cryptocurrency users to transact 
on a peer-to-peer basis with nearly no fees. Likewise, the transaction process with 
cryptocurrencies is often significantly quicker and more secure since the transaction data 
is permanently recorded within the blockchain and protected by cryptographic algorithms. 
Therefore, coupled with the decreased cost of transacting, incorporating cryptocurrency 
into the payment structure would decrease the costs of doing business, which could lead to 
more purchasing power of the customers.  
The merchants and customers are not the only beneficiaries from a cryptocurrency 
adoption. Vigna and Casey point out that individuals reliant on global remittance—when 
migrant workers are sent abroad for work to send money via international transfer services 
to relatives in their home countries—would become a major benefactor from a state 
accepted cryptocurrency. They write of traditional currency transactions, “fees for money 
sent from the United States often hit 10 percent; from . . . other countries it can be double 
that. With exchange-rate costs, the total friction in the transaction can run as high as 30 
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percent.”255 For individuals who rely on out-of-country remittance(s), the money saved 
through the use of cryptocurrency would be a substantial gain in purchasing power as the 
recipients could in-turn use the increase available money within their local economy or as 
savings.  
Ultimately, sovereign states could use cryptocurrency to increase economic 
opportunities and support their citizens. The adoption or creation of a sovereign 
cryptocurrency would indirectly facilitate state interests by providing extra money to the 
transactors, money that would normally lost to fiat transaction costs, but that citizens could 
then return to the local or regional economy, eventually bolstering the economic capacity 
of the state.  
3. To Bypass Sanctions 
Authors in this thesis’s literature review generally view the capability for 
cryptocurrency to easily bypass sanctions negatively; nevertheless, for states on the 
receiving end of economic sanctions, cryptocurrency offers a form of economic relief. For 
one, cryptocurrency’s ability to transact and move wealth internationally without utilizing 
third parties offers sovereign states—and ostensibly those countries currently under 
international sanctions like Venezuela or Russia—the capability to ignore international 
laws and policies. States can take advantage of the disruptive enterprise that cryptocurrency 
promotes by creating a state-backed cryptocurrency controlled by the state, or likewise, 
incorporate a stateless cryptocurrency as an additional form of money.  
4. The Auditability of Cryptocurrency 
Another use of cryptocurrency is that sovereign states could use cryptocurrency’s 
ability to maintain a ledger of every transaction to its advantage by adopting a state-created 
cryptocurrency to audit money flows and enhance AML/CTF laws. Sovereign states could 
create a trackable cryptocurrency, similar to Bitcoin; however, the proposed state 
cryptocurrency system would need to maximize the identification of users and require 
cryptocurrency users to register with the government. The government cryptocurrency 
                                                 
255 Vigna and Casey, 189–190.  
 73 
would incentivize users to register due to cryptocurrency’s capacity to transact more 
cheaply on a peer-to-peer basis than other electronic methods of transaction (as mentioned 
earlier). Additionally, a proposed state-sponsored cryptocurrency would encourage legal 
employment of the cryptocurrency while discouraging the illegal use of other 
cryptocurrencies. By requiring users to register, the system would discourage illegal actors 
from using cryptocurrency. In contrast, licit actors have no need to hide their identity and 
should comply with the registration policy.   
B. STATES THAT ACCEPT, PLAN TO ADOPT, OR HAVE ISSUED STATE-
BACKED CRYPTOCURRENCIES 
Currently, there are no known states that have adopted Bitcoin or any other stateless 
cryptocurrency as their national currency; however, there are several states that have 
released or are developing their own state-backed cryptocurrency. This section outlines a 
selection of countries that have released a sovereign cryptocurrency and are working on 
their own bitcoin-like state-backed cryptocurrency. Also, it examines the real-world cases 
where Bitcoin has become the preferable form of money.  
1. The Venezuelan Petro  
In the beginning of 2018, President Nicolas Maduro of Venezuela announced to the 
world that Venezuela would issue a cryptocurrency that pegs its value to the price of a 
barrel of oil.256 The Venezuelan Petro, which is named after the commodity it represents, 
is designed by the Venezuelan government as a cryptocurrency to be bought, sold, and 
exchanged for other cryptocurrencies like Bitcoin. Moreover, Venezuela promoted a public 
presale of the state-backed cryptocurrency to obtain capital prior to the official release, 
successfully raising approximately 735 million USD for the government on opening 
day.257 The Venezuelan government claims that the state-backed cryptocurrency will 
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become widely accepted within the country, allowing the citizens of Venezuela “to make 
payments to public institutions, including tax payments, according to official documents 
explaining the initiative.”258  
The release of the Petro, however, has had a number of critics internationally, and 
the future of the Petro is uncertain as hyperinflation and a weak economy continue to take 
their toll on the U.S. sanctioned country. Robert Looney asserts that Venezuela is plagued 
by a series of poor economic choices, which have resulted in the hyperinflation of the state 
fiat currency, the bolivar, with an inflation rate expected to reach over 3400 percent by 
2019.259 He explains, “The Petro’s primary function would be to secretly move cash out 
of a collapsing economy and convert it into foreign currency, making a Petro a digital 
money laundering tool for government insiders and their cronies.”260 Moreover, There are 
a number of countries that argue the petro is a simply a ploy by the Venezuelan government 
to raise capital and skirt international sanctions in the process. For instance, via executive 
order, the United States has released guidance on the petro prohibiting U.S. citizens from 
purchasing or trading with the Venezuelan virtual currency.261 Because the cryptocurrency 
is peer-to-peer, Venezuela can transfer wealth in and out of the state without dealing with 
the institutions that assist in enforcing international sanctions.  
Another interesting revelation is that the Venezuelan government was not acting 
unilaterally in the design and release of the state backed cryptocurrency. According to a 
March exclusive issue by Time, the Petro release is a joint experiment between Russia and 
Venezuela to design and test a virtual currency in a sanctioned country.262 The exclusive 
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notes that Russia has expressed interest in creating its own official “CryptoRuble;” 
however, the Russians are concerned about the economic and political backlash they might 
face. Simon Shuster comments, “instead of putting the ruble at risk, Russia encouraged its 
ally in Latin America to run the experiment on itself.”263 Ultimately, the pending success 
or failure of the Venezuelan cryptocurrency and its effectiveness in dodging U.S. sanctions 
may pay dividends to other internationally-sanctioned countries, as the Petro becomes a 
baseline test that other countries—like Russia—can use in the development of their own 
cryptocurrency.   
The Petro may not be an ideal example of a state-backed cryptocurrency due to the 
unique circumstances around its development and the economic status of its backer nation; 
nonetheless, its emergence is the first case of a state-backed cryptocurrency to be sold as a 
part of the cryptocurrency ecosystem. One day after the launch of the Petro and after raising 
a proclaimed 735 million USD, Maduro announced the Petro Gold, a cryptocurrency that 
is planned to be backed by the Venezuela’s gold commodity.264 Irrespective of the 
intentions for its use, the Petro as a state-backed cryptocurrency, has proven that a state can 
develop and market a cryptocurrency internationally.  
2. The Russian “CryptoRuble”  
The Russian Federation has also announced it is interested in the creation of a state-
backed cryptocurrency. As a complement to Russia’s evolving cryptocurrency initiative, 
President Putin recently introduced five directives in October 2017 ordering the creation 
of new domestic legislation to tax and regulate cryptocurrency, specifically targeting the 
Russian miners, ICOs, and exchanges in Russia.265 Following the announcement by its 
president, Russia has been swept by a wave of cryptocurrency acceptance within the 
country. According Shannon Liao, businesses have started accepting cryptocurrency as a 
payment method and graphics cards essential to mining cryptocurrency are in short supply 
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across the country.266 Also according to Liao, Russia’s official stance on cryptocurrency 
has been increasingly unclear over the past few years as it ranges from appearing 
increasingly restrictive toward cryptocurrency users whereby the state threatened jail time 
to cryptocurrency users, to meeting with prominent founders of cryptocurrency outside of 
the state. Liao writes that these new initiatives are “likely part of the digital ruble initiative 
that the Russian Central Bank has been pursuing.”267 By regulating the existing miners, 
traders, and exchanges that deal with cryptocurrency, Russia would be better prepared to 
introduce and market its own state-backed cryptocurrency.  
As aforementioned in the discussion on the Venezuelan Petro, Russia has an 
expressed interest in exploring how cryptocurrencies can bypass sanctions and state 
borders. Zura Kadushadze and Jim Kyung-Soo Liew write in detail on the CryptoRuble 
and Russia’s motivations behind the development of a state-issued cryptocurrency. They 
argue, “Russia’s . . . primary goal in issuing a government cryptocurrency is to free their 
monetary system from the controls exerted by the Federal Reserve (Fed), European Central 
Bank (ECB), and their allied central banks.”268 They also argue that the Cryptoruble 
unchains itself from the western countries banks by “[creating] a buffer layer that only the 
Russian government has control over with pertinent information inaccessible to the Fed/
ECB, . . . the U.S., the E.U., etc.”269 (see Figure 5). In the form imagined by Kadushadze 
and Liew, the CryptoRuble would be able to effectively launder money through the Russian 
central authority and subject to manipulation at the hands of the Russian oligarchs.  
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Figure 5.  “A Schematic Depiction of the Money Flow  
into and from CryptoRuble”270 
Russia has also announced a CryptoRuble registration system to combat the 
anonymity inherent in stateless cryptocurrency systems; however, that too, appears to be 
dubious in execution. According to news reports released in 2017 by local Russian media, 
the proposed CryptoRuble would have a 13 percent tax applied to all unregistered 
exchanges of currency.271 Kakushadze and Liew write that the unregistered user tax is 
“akin to a government-mandated money laundering machine and with such a low overhead 
should be extremely attractive to all sorts of shady players.”272 Furthermore, since the 
ledger that records all transactions would be maintained by the government, Kakushadze 
and Liew assert that Russia could later blackmail unsuspecting illicit actors using the 
CryptoRuble to launder money. 
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Russia’s proposed CryptoRuble would differ in function from Bitcoin’s to ensure 
that the Russian government have complete and solitary control over the cryptocurrency. 
As discussed in Chapter II, Bitcoin’s model revolves around a decentralized public ledger 
stored within the blockchain and managed by a volunteer ecosystem of incentivized miners 
and nodes which expand the blockchain by validating bitcoin transactions. Conversely, the 
CryptoRuble would be centralized whereby the Russian government would be solely 
responsible for maintaining the cryptoruble ledger and controlling access to the 
cryptocurrency. Kakushadze and Liew assert the CryptoRuble would be more efficient than 
Bitcoins and the “central banks and sovereign governments . . . more control, not less, than 
with the current banking system.”273 The CryptoRuble has yet to be released, and the 
conclusion of many authors concerning the intent of the CryptoRuble are speculative in 
nature; nevertheless, the development and future release of a Russian cryptocurrency 
provides insight into how a state-backed cryptocurrency could become disruptive to the 
international financial system.  
3. Countries where Bitcoin Have Become the Trusted Currency 
Bitcoin has become a major store of value and trusted money supply for the citizens 
of Kenya, Sudan, South Africa, and Zimbabwe. Currently, none of the four countries 
governments support Bitcoin; however, Bitcoin’s ability to transact internationally and peg 
its value to the supply and demand outside of the secluded African countries has made the 
cryptocurrency an attractive choice for a store of wealth. Matina Stevis-Gridneff and 
Georgi Kantchev note that Bitcoin “is often viewed as a haven from political and economic 
turmoil” that plagues many less developed or developing nations.274 These cases of bitcoin 
adoption by the people of the country without the consent of the sovereign government 
provides insight to how an actual state-sponsored cryptocurrency might function under 
similar circumstances.  
Cryptocurrencies are often cited as a means to bypass sanctions as a negative, but 
for the citizens of Sudan, Bitcoin offers a way to transact internationally bypassing the 
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sanctioned Sudanese government.275 Similarly, in Zimbabwe where hyperinflation runs 
rampant, the classically volatile value of bitcoin has become a source of reliability in 
comparison. MacDonald Dzirutwe asserts that inflation in the country has risen to nearly 
50 percent per month—despite switching to the U.S. dollar as the official currency for the 
country—making bitcoin the de facto currency for many people.276 In both cases, 
cryptocurrency has proven itself to be a reliable supply of money for the people and a 
trusted medium of exchange.  
Similar to the situation outlined in African countries, Bitcoin has become an outlier 
currency among Argentines who are frustrated with the government’s money controls over 
the state-backed fiat, the peso. Elena Moreno asserts, “For some Argentines, bitcoin is a 
legitimate alternative to state backed currency. According to one estimate, bitcoin users in 
Argentina trade $70,000–$80,000 over the counter per day.”277 As the time of writing, 
Argentina’s official stance on virtual currencies is that they are “not legal tender under the 
country’s National Constitution, which designated the Central Bank as the only authority 
that may issue legal tender.”278 While 70–80 thousand USD a day may not be a huge 
amount, Argentina still stands as a case study of a state wherein the people have chosen 
bitcoin as their choice of money over their sovereign currency.  
Jill Carlson studies the case of outlier Bitcoin adoption in Argentina and has 
attributed four variables why cryptocurrencies could see outlier adoption in a state that 
does not currently support virtual currencies. She suggests that the factors of “capital 
control circumvention, . . . tax evasion, . . . cultural and ideological factors . . . and the 
presence of multiple accepted currencies and exchange rates may play a critical role in 
                                                 
275 Stevis-Gridneff and Kantchev.  
276 MacDonald Dzirutwe, “Think Bitcoin’s Getting Expensive? Try Zimbabwe,” Reuters, November 
12, 2017, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-zimbabwe-bitcoin/think-bitcoins-getting-expensive-try-
zimbabwe-idUSKBN1DD0NF.  
277 Elena Christine Moreno, Bitcoin in Argentina: Inflation, Currency Restrictions, and the Rise of 




278 “Digital Currencies,” Perkins Coie.   
 80 
acceptance of a new entrant into the economy.”279 Although cryptocurrency use in 
countries like Kenya, Sudan, South Africa, Zimbabwe, and Argentina are not sanctioned 
by the governments, an analysis of how bitcoin became a preferred currency would prove 
useful for a sovereign state in a similar situation that chooses to implement or adopt a 
cryptocurrency; however, such an analysis is outside the scope of this thesis and is one of 
the areas this thesis recommends for future research in the conclusion.   
4. The U.S. Fedcoin 
The U.S. dollar is arguably the most widely used currency on earth. As Kimberly 
Amadeo writes, the U.S. dollar “makes up 64 percent of all known central bank foreign 
exchange reserves. That makes it the def facto global currency.”280 As a result of its 
importance to the global economy, the U.S. dollar has become trusted, but what if the 
United States builds on the earned trust to promote its own sovereign-cryptocurrency for 
worldwide use? Enter the fedcoin.  
The idea for an official Federal Reserve cryptocurrency (fedcoin) has been widely 
explored by scholars who study banking, economics, and virtual currencies. In 2014, JP 
Koning first pitched the fedcoin, and among scholars, the idea has since gained popularity 
to become the default title of a theoretical U.S. backed cryptocurrency.281 From the 
literature this researcher examined, most authors envision the theoretical fedcoin as 
blockchain based, centralized in control, and pegged to the U.S. dollar. As stated Morten 
Bech and Rodney Garratt on the behalf of the BIS,  
[T]he idea is for the Federal Reserve to create a cryptocurrency that is 
similar to bitcoin. However, unlike with bitcoin, only the Federal Reserve 
would be able to create Fed Coins and there would be one-for-one 
convertibility with cash and reserve. Fedcoins would only be created 
(destroyed) if an equivalent amount of cash or reserves were destroyed 
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(created) at the same time. Like cash, Fedcoin would be decentralised in 
transaction and centralised in supply.282 
Although Bech and Garratt envision the Fedcoin as a “third component of the monetary 
base, alongside cash and reserves,”283 not all researchers believe that a Fedcoin is feasible.  
Berentsen and Schar have come to the conclusion that a central bank 
cryptocurrency permitting anonymity is unrealistic. They write, “no reputable central bank 
would issue a decentralized virtual currency where users can remain anonymous.”284 
Instead, they argue in favor for “Central Bank Electronic Money,” which is comprised of 
a centralized and not anonymous, virtual, and monopolized by the central bank. Figure 6 
depicts the different structures between a central bank cryptocurrency and central bank 
electronic money by Berentsen and Schar. Nevertheless, scholars agree that there is 
breathing room in the global economy for the creation of a U.S.-backed digital currency, 
cryptocurrency, or otherwise. As Vigna and Casey state, 
the dollar is already the world’s primary reserve and commercial currency, 
but this [a U.S. digital dollar] would give it an even bigger edge. That’s 
because people in countries whose currencies aren’t trusted or who are 
barred or restricted from buying foreign currencies—think China, 
Argentina, Russia—Could now easily obtain the one currency that has long 
symbolized international stability.285 
In the near future, it is likely that the United States will be forced to confront new 
virtual challenges as individuals worldwide find new and cheaper methods to transfer 
money and transact. Chris Telley argues, “the U.S. national security community must 
understand the power of cryptocurrencies, recognize threat adaptations, and invest in 
capabilities to influence the digital economy environment.”286 The development of a 
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cryptocurrency fedcoin—centralized or decentralized, pseudonymous or otherwise—
would enable the United States to influence the digital economy and provide it an 
advantage over sovereign countries that have proposed their own sovereign virtual 
currencies, such as Russia’s CryptoRuble.  
 
Figure 6.  The Control Structure of Currencies287 
5. Other Countries Studying or Developing Cryptocurrencies 
Venezuela, Russia, and the United States are not the only countries interested in 
studying and developing cryptocurrency. Prasad writes that in addition to Venezuela, 
Russia, and the United States, the countries of China, Japan, France, Canada, United 
Kingdom, Brazil, Australia, South Africa, Singapore, Hong Kong, Sweden, Philippines, 
Indonesia, India, Lebanon, Eastern Caribbean, South Korea, Israel, and the Netherlands, 
all have active programs exploring blockchain technology as a currency or have officially 
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announced plans to release their own virtual currency based on the blockchain.288 Another 
future application of cryptocurrency could be a regional supranational cryptocurrency, like 
a virtual euro coin, which would encompass an entire region and be accepted by a number 
sovereignties.   
C. POTENTIAL CHALLENGES TO ADOPTING CRYPTOCURRENCY 
A state adopting an existing cryptocurrency or creating its own must also confront 
a number of variables to protect its economic and political wellbeing. This section provides 
a selective list of four obstacles or vulnerabilities that can hinder the cryptocurrency 
adoption process: a speculative attack on a sovereign state’s central bank, domestic 
pushback on cryptocurrency acceptance within a sovereign state, the pushback from the 
third-party institutions that stand to lose profits from the implementation of a peer-to-peer 
state-backed cryptocurrency, and the 51 percent vulnerability that malicious actors could 
use to disrupt or discredit a sovereign-state’s cryptocurrency system.  
1. Speculative Attack 
One weakness of a sovereign state adopting or recognizing a stateless 
cryptocurrency like Bitcoin is that the adopting country then becomes vulnerable to a 
speculative attack. Nicholas Plassaras explicates “a speculative attack on a currency occurs 
when an investor wishes to take advantage of a ‘weak currency,’ a currency that has 
depreciated in value relative to other currencies.”289 The objective of a speculative attack 
is that it takes advantage of a discrepancy called a maturity mismatch of funds, a term used 
in this case when the bank is forced to buy the weaker currency at a loss. Plassaras asserts, 
“This discrepancy [maturity mismatch] gradually depletes the bank’s supply of the attacked 
currency over time,” and if not properly protected against, the attack could “[trigger] 
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destabilization in the foreign currency exchange market.”290 Plassaras highlights that 
traditionally, international institutions like the IMF keep reserves of currencies to provide 
assistance to the banks when needed and to protect against speculative attacks. However, 
the IMF does not currently hold any supply of cryptocurrency, and therefore it cannot assist 
banks with absorbing a maturity mismatch involving cryptocurrencies.291 
Although Plassaras’s solution of the banks vulnerability to maturity mismatch 
would be for the IMF to hold a reserve stock of cryptocurrency, he also notes there are 
obstacles to this proposal.292 First, he notes that that Article VII of the IMF’s Articles of 
Agreement “only authorizes the IMF to collect currency from member nations.”293 
Second, if cryptocurrencies become a part of the IMF reserves, who would be responsible 
for the purchase of the cryptocurrency? If sovereign states were to adopt or accept a 
stateless cryptocurrency like Bitcoin before adequate measures are put in place to protect 
banks from maturity mismatches, they would find themselves at higher risk to speculative 
attack.  
2. Domestic Pushback as an Accepted Currency 
Adopting a state-approved cryptocurrency carries significant hurdles in both 
implementation and adoption. As highlighted in Chapter II, the concepts of the Bitcoin 
protocol and blockchain are complex. As a consequence of the intricacies of 
cryptocurrency, citizens, unfamiliar with cryptocurrency technology, may refuse to trust 
cryptocurrencies over a money supply that can be physically seen or held. Likewise, Vigna 
and Casey highlight that unique to each country, there are significant social and cultural 
barriers that a state-sanctioned cryptocurrency must overcome to become widely accepted 
and adopted.294 The adoption of a cryptocurrency by the state would only be successful if 
the citizens trust and use the cryptocurrency as a form of money.  
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3. Resident Institutional Pushback 
Even if a cryptocurrency similar in concept to Bitcoin was adopted by a sovereign 
state, a number of institutional pushbacks internal to the state could disrupt the adoption 
process. As Chapter II discusses, cryptocurrency is peer-to-peer and avoids the traditional 
third-parties associated with fiat currencies; those third-parties, like banks, stand to lose 
profits if a state-sanctioned cryptocurrency is introduced into the economy. In Prasad’s 
2018 study of how cryptocurrency would alter central banking, he comes to the conclusion 
that  
Financial institutions, especially banks, could face challenges to their 
business models, as new technologies facilitate the entry of institutions (or 
decentralized mechanisms) that can undertake financial intermediation and 
overcome information asymmetries. Banks will find it difficult to continue 
collecting economic rents on some activities that cross-subsidize other 
activities. The emergence of new institutions and mechanisms could 
improve financial intermediation but will pose significant challenges in 
terms of regulation and financial stability.295 
As a consequence, sovereign states may find significant political barriers to the 
implementation of cryptocurrency erected by political lobbyists representing the 
businesses that stand to lose revenue from the introduction of cryptocurrency.  
4. 51 Percent Attack 
One of the most discussed weaknesses in cryptocurrencies like Bitcoin is the notion 
of a 51 percent attack. As discussed in Chapter II, Bitcoin miners achieve consensus on the 
correct blockchain and valid transactions through a distributed network of individual 
miners building the blockchain on top of the longest branch of valid transactions.296 In 
theory, a 51 percent attack occurs when a malicious actor gains control of the majority (51 
percent) of the network to obtain mining consensus on future transactions of the system.297 
Recall as discussed in Chapter II, miners will by default attempt to build on the longest 
blockchain; thus, as a result of controlling the majority of the network, a malicious attacker 
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could likely succeed in creating the longest branch of the blockchain.298 The malicious 
actor could then add new invalid blocks with invalid transactions to the blockchain to 
manipulate the public ledger.299 Cryptocurrencies like Bitcoin are praised for their 
resilience to outside attack, but the 51 percent attack is one the greatest weaknesses of 
decentralized virtual currencies. Similarly, Vigna and Casey submit that the 51 percent 
attack “eats at a lot of bitcoin intellectuals. Why? Because it’s the one irrefutable structural 
weakness in the bitcoin system.”300  
However, the 51 percent attack is limited to manipulating the future creation of 
blocks and cannot alter the protocol by which Bitcoin operates, nor can it alter public ledger 
prior to the attack. The security inherent in Bitcoin’s blockchain protocol that controls the 
rules of the system and the distributed public ledger is virtually uncrackable due to safety 
guaranteed by the hash function (as highlighted in Chapter II).301 According to Narayanan 
et al., if an attacker in control of 51 percent of the nodes were to attempt to manipulate the 
system, such as to steal bitcoins from another user, to spend bitcoins that the attacker does 
not own, or to change the block reward to a greater quantity of bitcoins, the Bitcoin network 
on the honest nodes would ignore the invalid actions.302 More importantly, if attackers 
were to somehow gain control of at least 51 percent of the network, their attack would be 
evident to the honest nodes. Narayanan et al. assert, “If there were, in fact, actual signs of 
a 51 percent attack, what would probably happen is that the developers would notice it and 
react.”303 The attack would have little bearing on the network’s users or capacity; instead, 
it would damage Bitcoin’s trust, an injury that would fair far worse to the cryptocurrency 
than a temporary disruption in services.  
As stated in the second chapter of this thesis, the concept of trust is essential to any 
currency’s adoption as a form of money. Narayanan et al. argue, “It is not only possible, 
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but in fact likely, that a 51 percent attacker of any sort will destroy confidence in the 
system.”304 Accounting for the fact that bitcoin’s value relies on the principles of supply 
and demand principles, if the cryptocurrency were to lose trust, the likely effect would 
result in the decline in value of bitcoin. Narayanan et al. emphasize that the point of a 51 
percent attack is one of disruption to “destroy confidence” because no other reason really 
“make[s] sense from a financial point of view.”305 To achieve the majority control of the 
network is no small feat, considering the Bitcoin network is rather large and interconnected 
worldwide by anonymous individual users who choose to participate in the process; 
however, the task is not impossible, especially for a sovereign state with a large amount of 
fiscal resources that is set on disrupting cryptocurrencies. As a result, the 51 percent attack 
remains a valid concern for any state adopting a decentralized, proof-of-work 
cryptocurrency.  
D. CONCLUSION 
Currently, no state other than Venezuela has released its own cryptocurrency, but 
it is likely that other states will develop and release their own version of the blockchain-
based virtual currency in the near future. Cryptocurrency’s potential to interconnect the 
globe and uplift the unbanked in poverty-stricken states, or to be used by sanctioned 
countries to bypass international laws, makes cryptocurrency a potentially powerful and 
disruptive tool for sovereign states. Its adoption is a double edge sword carrying a number 
of benefits and vulnerabilities in implementation and use. Venezuela is one of the first 
states to take advantage of a sovereign cryptocurrency. Additionally, with dozens of 
countries investigating the prospects of cryptocurrency, it is very likely that other countries 
will develop and introduce their own sovereign cryptocurrencies in the near future. This 
chapter has discussed the advantages and drawbacks in a sovereign cryptocurrency. Next 
chapter is this thesis’s conclusion, and it draws on the discussions in Chapter III, IV, and 
V to analyze how cryptocurrencies affect sovereign states.  
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VI. CONCLUSION 
Cryptocurrency is a disruptive technology easily accessible by illicit actors, 
resilient to sovereign state and international laws, and it is a capable medium to transfer 
wealth from person-to-person across multiple jurisdictions. Therefore, it is necessary that 
sovereign states carefully consider the best approach to limit illegal or disruptive 
cryptocurrency use. As Vigna and Casey assert,  
the decentralized bitcoin network and its public ledger, the blockchain, are 
at their essence a radical new way of dealing with information. . . .[I]t takes 
information about monetary transactions and economic exchanges out of 
the hands of monopolist institutions and creates a decentralized mechanism 
for society to judge the validity of that information.306 
As a consequence of cryptocurrency’s ability to subvert domestic and international 
economic models and law enforcement structure, sovereign states have issued a variety of 
legislation—varying by country—to limit cryptocurrency’s impact on the state. To address 
the relationship between the sovereign state and cryptocurrency technology, this thesis 
asked the following primary question: What options are available to the sovereign state to 
limit cryptocurrency’s capacity to challenge domestic and international laws? To further 
explore the main question, this thesis also examines the following three subquestions. First, 
what allows cryptocurrency to sidestep the established financial order and enforcement 
institutions? Second, what are the challenges sovereign states face when introducing 
cryptocurrency legislation? Finally, as cryptocurrency technology becomes more popular 
and countries begin developing their own blockchain-based tools, what factors would 
inhibit or promote a sovereign state from developing its own sovereign cryptocurrency?   
To address these questions, this thesis is divided into six chapters. After a detailed 
literature review in the first chapter, the thesis’s second chapter dissect the technology 
behind Bitcoin and other cryptocurrency ecosystems. Chapters III, IV, and V detail 
banning, regulating, and adopting cryptocurrency by sovereign states to highlight the 
consequences of each action by providing real-world examples of each approach. In 
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addition to finding states can ban, regulate, or adopt cryptocurrency, this thesis 
recommends that states carefully consider these options and develop a combination of the 
three approaches appropriate to political, economic, and fiscal interests. Additionally, this 
thesis recommends three specific approaches the international community could take to 
better mitigate the potential for cryptocurrency to be used disruptively.   
A. FINDINGS  
Cryptocurrency’s ability to transact from peer-to-peer while prioritizing anonymity 
has complicated the enforcement of previously established sovereign and international 
laws. Alone, cryptocurrencies are not illicit tools, but their features allow them to be used 
as a tool to transact without governmental oversight. As this thesis highlights in the 
literature review, the reduction of country’s sovereign power to enforce laws and prosecute 
illicit actors have also reduced countries’ capability to enforce domestic, homeland 
security, and homeland defense policies. The benefits offered in cryptocurrency 
transactions have allowed organized crime and drug traffickers, terrorist groups, rouge 
states like North Korea, and sanctioned countries like Russia to conduct transactions 
without U.S. or other international interference. To examine how cryptocurrency provides 
near anonymous, stateless, peer-to-peer transactions, Chapter II of this thesis dissects the 
cryptocurrency Bitcoin and the Bitcoin ecosystem to analyze the technology permitting 
Bitcoin to operate without the need of a sovereign government.  
As discussed in Chapter III, cryptocurrencies like Bitcoin will continue to flourish 
regardless of whether or not a country incorporates a complete ban on cryptocurrency 
transactions. Sovereign states have the option to outlaw cryptocurrency mining, exchanges, 
trading, or fundraising through ICOs; however, the stateless nature of cryptocurrency 
makes it accessible to any individual with access to the Internet. Chapter III notes that 
China’s government and central bank have all but outlawed ownership of cryptocurrency 
in an effort to gain greater command over domestic capital controls and the export of 
Chinese wealth, forcing the majority of Chinese based cryptocurrency mining companies 
and exchanges to migrate to less restrictive countries, like Singapore and Canada. Despite 
the heavy Chinese restrictions on cryptocurrency, the stateless cryptocurrency network 
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continued to thrive, and the citizens of China will continue to access and transact with 
cryptocurrency unless the government successfully bans access to digital wallets and 
exchanges.  
This thesis also has found a number of technical and political hurdles challenging 
sovereign states’ ability to regulate cryptocurrency. Chapter IV notes that since 
cryptocurrency has emerged, countries have struggled to define or categorize it under the 
framework of existing laws. Depending on the country and regulatory agency, virtual 
currencies—the category cryptocurrency falls under—are classified as either a security, 
currency, property, or commodity. Moreover, the term cryptocurrency is often referred to 
in the pejorative, insinuating that cryptocurrency is a form of money that is unregulated 
and associated with illicit circles; however, owning, investing in, or transacting with 
cryptocurrency is not inherently criminal in nature. To date, there has yet to be any 
internationally agreed upon method, minimum standard, metric, or guidance for countries 
to pursue cryptocurrency legislation. Ultimately, cryptocurrency remains an amorphous 
system of electronic money still unrecognized by the majority countries as official method 
of transaction.  
This thesis has also examined the advantages, disadvantages and limitations in the 
introduction of a state-backed sovereign cryptocurrency in Chapter V. This thesis finds that 
countries can introduce a sovereign cryptocurrency developed specifically for official use 
as an attractive and reliable form of virtual money. Sovereign cryptocurrencies, much like 
Bitcoin, are efficient, unforgeable, and easily auditable characteristics provided through 
blockchain; however, unlike stateless cryptocurrencies, state-backed cryptocurrencies 
would be centrally controlled by the sovereign government or central bank and would 
likely minimize or actively disincentivize user anonymity through required registration or 
taxing anonymous transactions. Moreover, countries facing international economic 
sanctions, like Russia and Venezuela are, could use the disruptive features of 
cryptocurrency to their advantage, bypassing sanctioning institutions or countries during 
international transfers of wealth. To ensure the state-sponsored cryptocurrency is accepted 
transnationally, a sovereign country could buy back or link the value of a state produced 
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commodity like petroleum, natural gas, or gold, forcing other countries to buy in to or 
exchange for the sanctioned state cryptocurrency to purchase the given resource.  
B. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
After this thesis’s in-depth analysis, this thesis recommends two specific policy 
actions that sovereign states and the international community can to take to address future 
cryptocurrency strategy. The policy recommendations are to redefine cryptocurrency as its 
own category under sovereign law to promote awareness of the laws and drawbacks on 
cryptocurrency as well as to create an international standard comprising of a composition 
of banning, regulating, and adoption standards that would enable states to reign in and 
prosecute undesired cryptocurrency usage under their sovereignty.  
1. Redefine Cryptocurrency  
To ease the legislative process of introducing new laws and clarify the rules for 
domestic companies and citizens, sovereign states could clearly define cryptocurrencies 
and other virtual currencies in their own category. This thesis points out that 
cryptocurrency is a revolutionary new step forward in innovative, open-source technology, 
and unless laws drastically change to restrict cryptocurrencies, companies and businesses 
are likely to continue refining blockchain technology well into the future. However, in 
countries that embrace technological developments, virtual currency regulations are often 
convoluted, ambiguous, and contradictory. The United States is a prime example as it 
classifies cryptocurrency as property, a security, or commodity to fit under existing laws 
and enumerates a variety of regulatory agencies to individually develop new, state-wide 
cryptocurrency guidance. Rather than allowing individual regulatory bodies to interpret 
cryptocurrency under their jurisdictions, the creation of an all-encompassing categorization 
for virtual currencies with clearly distinct and subordinate legislation, specifically 
distinguishing licit and illicit cryptocurrency actions, would prevent confusion regarding 
cryptocurrencies among citizens and businesses. 
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2. New International Standards on Cryptocurrency Regulation 
A new transnational or international set of regulatory minimums and information 
sharing could minimize the disruptive capacity of stateless and state-backed 
cryptocurrency transactions. Despite proposals to regulate cryptocurrency on an 
international level, there still remains a lack of international standards or minimum 
requirements—outside of AML/CTF regulations—for countries to reference when dealing 
with limiting, prohibiting, reporting, or using cryptocurrency exchanges, users, and miners. 
A common framework of cryptocurrency regulation, possibly enforced by international 
organizations and agreements (such as the IMF or Basel banking accords), would allow 
governments to work together to monitor and track illicit transactions occurring across 
sovereign borders. Furthermore, international institutions will be forced in the near-future 
to create guidelines or restrictions for transactions with sovereign cryptocurrency. 
Sovereign cryptocurrencies, like the Petro and CryptoRuble, facilitate new means for 
countries to move money that they otherwise would be unable to using traditional fiat, thus 
avoiding transnational banking oversight and imposed sanctions. The creation of 
internationally agreed upon regulatory minimums for cryptocurrencies could potentially 
alleviate the disruptive effects from the introduction of new sovereign cryptocurrency. 
C. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
This thesis discusses a number of current regulatory actions taken by different 
countries but is unable to provide analysis of the effectiveness of cryptocurrency 
legislation. For future research, this thesis recommends research into the development of a 
metric to measure the effectiveness of existing legislation to determine if sovereign states 
have prevented illicit transactions in accordance with AML/CTF standards. Additionally, 
new laws and regulations need to be designed to counter sovereign-state developed 
cryptocurrencies, therefore warranting research into how disruptive state cryptocurrencies, 
such as the Petro or CryptoRuble, could be contained, exploited, or challenged. Another 
potential research topic could analyze how the regime type of government (democratic, 
authoritarian, etc.) correlates to how the government is to regulate cryptocurrency. For 
example, Russia, Sudan, China, and Venezuela all have aspects of authoritarianism in their 
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governmental structures; however, their approaches to cryptocurrency widely differs. 
Scholars could potentially use this prospective research question to predict future 
regulatory responses by sovereign states concerning new innovative and disruptive 
technologies like cryptocurrency.  
D. CONCLUSION 
The propensity of individuals, criminal organizations, terrorist groups, and 
sovereign states to use cryptocurrency to ignore domestic and international laws and reduce 
the security of sovereign states prompts action by countries around the globe. Keeping in 
mind cryptocurrencies’ ability to challenge sovereign states’ capacity to enforce domestic 
and international laws, individual countries would be wise to develop their own legislative 
approach combining regulating, adopting, and banning specific aspects, while participating 
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